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Bringing the Perpetrators of Rape in the
Balkans to Justice: Time for an
International Criminal Court
CAROLINE D.

RASS

The Security Council... appalled by reports of massive, organized
and systematic detention and rape of women, in particular Muslim
women, in Bosnia and Herzegovina... strongly condemns these
acts of unspeakable brutality.'

On December 18, 1992, the Security Council of the United Nations

expressed the abhorrence of the world community regarding the ongoing rape of women and girls in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.2 According to a report by a team of experts from the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the rape of women and
minors in Bosnia and Herzegovina has occurred on a large scale, and
evidence indicates that women and girls have been detained for ex-

tended periods of time and raped repeatedly.' In a ten day visit to
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the U.N. experts identified 119 pregnancies

resulting from rape and determined that the abortion rate at a clinic
in Sarajevo between September and November 1992 had reached four
times its pre-war level.5 The experts found no sign of any attempt by
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Patricia M. Wald, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 1993-1994. BA. Stanford University 1989;
J.D. Yale Law School 1993. The author would like to thank Professor Harold H. Koh
for his invaluable assistance.
1. Sec. C. Res. 798, U.N. Doc. S/RES/798 (1992).
2. Although rape has occurred throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia
and has been perpetrated on all sides of the conflict, this article focuses on the rape
of Muslim women in Bosnia and Herzegovina because it is part of the systematic
policy of "ethnic cleansing."
3. Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.
ESCOR, 49th Ses., Agenda item 27, at 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.450 (1993) [hereinafter
U.N. Human Rights Report]. The team of four medical and psychiatric experts visited Bosnia and Herzegovina between January 12 and 23, 1993. Id. at 4. See also
Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Names Figures it Wants Charged with War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1992, at Al (government and human rights organizations have documented
gang rape, the incarceration of women and girls impregnated by rape, the forcing of
women into brothels, and murder of rape victims).
4. The U.N. Human Rights Report noted that this number should be seen as a
minimum because pregnancies resulting from rape are under-reported due to the
emotional pain and stigma associated with rape. U.N. Human Rights Report, supra
note 3, at 67.
5. Id.
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those in power to stop the sexual violence.6
A more recent statement by the U.N. War Crimes Commission
indicates that the International Human Rights Law Institute at
DePaul University has collected evidence of approximately 3,000 rapes
and has identified approximately 800 victims by name.7 Although the
reports of mass rape would suffice to shock the world's conscience, its
incidence in the current conflict has taken on a new twist: rape as a
tool of genocide.8
While nothing will erase the physical and mental scars inflicted
on the victims of rape, they could take legal action against the perpetrators of the atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, although
several fora exist to bring the perpetrators of rape to justice, all are
ineffective. To provide relief effectively, a forum must be able to provide the following protections: (1) allow individual access to the prosecution; (2) be impartial; (3) make decisions based on law; (4) avoid
politicization; (5) issue judgments with precedential value; (6) resolve
cases on the merits; (7) have an enforcement mechanism; (8) reach
decisions in a timely manner; and (9) have flexible procedures.
This article argues that due to the defects of the fora currently
available to the victims of rape, the world community should create an
international adjudicatory body with jurisdiction over certain international crimes. The adjudicatory body could take the form of an ad hoc
tribunal for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. Or, preferably, it could become a permanent international criminal court. Section I of this article briefly describes the current juridical situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Section II outlines the various fora currently
available to arraign the perpetrators of rape and identifies the problems with these fora. Section III describes the mechanics of the proposed war crimes tribunal with jurisdiction over crimes committed in
the former Yugoslavia and then evaluates the tribunal. Finally, Section IV surveys the debate over the creation of a permanent international criminal court, analyzes the proposals for such a forum, and
concludes by calling for its establishment. Because the peculiar and
unique legal status of the conflict in Bosnia has placed many traditional legal doctrines in limbo, it is useful to begin by briefly describing
the current juridical situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6. Id. at 72.
7. Rape was Weapon of Serbs, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1993, at Al.
8. Although the current conflict represents the first time rape has been used
with a genocidal objective, this is not the first time rape has been used as a weapon

of war. Throughout the ages, armed forces have relied on rape as a tactic to demoralize, intimidate, and retaliate against the enemy. See generally
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OuR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 31-133 (1975).

SUSAN
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I. THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA: JURIDICAL STATUS

The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials provide the sole examples of
criminal prosecutions of individuals before an international war crimes
tribunal. Under the Nuremberg paradigm, an ad hoc tribunal entertains prosecutions for genocide committed in the course of an international armed conflict between recognized states." The mass rape of
women and children in Bosnia, however, deviates from this paradigm:
the international community does not recognize the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia as a state; no court has classified rape as genocide; and
the Bosnian conflict can be characterized as either civil or international. Therefore, the Bosnian situation presents several new and difficult
legal issues.
The international community recognized the independence of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("former Yugoslavia") in early April 1992.0 On April
27, 1992, the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro formed a new Yugoslav state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("Federal Republic"),
which holds a yet uncertain international status. In September 1992,
the General Assembly decided that the Federal Republic could not
automatically succeed to the seat of former Yugoslavia in the United
Nations1' - it would have to reapply for membership under Article 4
of the U.N. Charter. The UN has not yet granted it membership.'
However, the UN has permitted the Federal Republic to maintain a
mission at the United Nations and to participate in the work of some
non-Assembly bodies."3
The international community has not yet addressed whether the
rape of women and children in Bosnia and Herzegovina qualifies as
genocide. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a party to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide ("Genocide Convention") since March 6, 1992, the date it seceded from the
former Yugoslavia. 1' The Federal Republic is also a party to the Genocide Convention, because on April 27, 1992 it formally declared that it
would "strictly abide by all the commitments that the Socialist Federal

9. See generally ROBERT K. WoETzEL, THE NUIEMERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1962).
10. HELsINm WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERcEGOVINA [sic] 30 (1992).
11. John M. Gosho, U.N. Declares Yugoslav Seat to be Vacant, WASH. POST,
Sept. 23, 1992, at A27.
12. Order in Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia
and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 13 [hereinafter I.C.J. Order].
13. Id.
14. See Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)),
I.C.J. Pleadings 32 (Mar. 20, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bosnian I.C.J.
Application].
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Republic of Yugoslavia assumed internationally. "' The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ratified the Genocide Convention without
reservation on August 29, 1950.
According to Article II of the Genocide Convention:
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group, as such: ... causing serious bodily or mental harm to mem-

bers of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; [or]
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
17
group.

The systematic rape and forced pregnancy of Muslim women and girls
qualifies as genocide under all parts of this definition. The Bosnian
Serb soldiers employ rape as an instrument of "ethnic cleansing," the
euphemism used to describe the Serbian policy of forcing non-Serbs out
of certain regions of the former Yugoslavia." According to the
Bosnian government, "mass rapes are being used to intentionally destroy the national, religious, and cultural identity of the Muslim people
in Bosnia."" A European Community investigative mission into the
treatment of women in the former Yugoslavia found that the Serbs
commit rape with the "conscious intention of demoralizing and terrorizing communities, driving them from their home regions, and demonstrating the power of the armed forces."'
To inflict the maximum amount of humiliation on the victims,
their families, and the community, the Bosnian-Serbs commit some of
the rapes in particularly sadistic ways."1 Rape victims have reported
that their assailants shouted "you will have a Serbian child.' Some
were also told that if they became pregnant they would be forcibly detained to prevent termination of the pregnancy." Even when repeated

15. LC.J. Order, supra note 12, at 14.
16. Id.
17. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, GA Res. 260(A) (MII), 78 U.N.T.S. 278, 280 (entered into force
Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
18. See, e.g., Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia: the Rape and
Abuse of Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.21 (1993) (expressing outrage of United Nations
Commission on Human Rights that the systematic practice of rape is being used as
a weapon of war against Muslim women and children and as an instrument of the
policy of ethnic cleansing).
19. Bosnian I.C.J. Application, supra note 14 at 17.
20. European Community Investigative Mission Into the Treatment of Muslim
Women in the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR at 6, U.N. Doc. S/25240 (1993) [hereinafter European Investigative Report].
21. Id. at 5.
22. U.N. Human Rights Report, supra note 3, at 69; see also European Investigative Report, supra note 20, at 5.
23. Id.
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rape fails to produce "Serbian" babies, it still furthers the policy of
"ethnic cleansing" by eliminating the child-bearing capacity of the
Muslim victims directly, through physical abuse, or indirectly, by virtue of the societal stigma attached to victims of rape. This stigma
proves especially severe in Muslim communities, where the religion
emphasizes virginity and chastity before marriage." Because the perpetrators intend the elimination of the child-bearing capability of Muslim women and girls as a consequence of rape, "ethnic cleansing" actually qualifies as genocide.
Whether the ongoing war in Bosnia and Herzegovina qualifies as
an international, rather than an internal, armed conflict poses another
important juridical question. Although at first most of the fighting in
Bosnia occurred between Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, Croatian forces
have joined the melee. Paramilitary groups from the Federal Republic
and reserve forces of the Yugoslav People's Army have aided the
Bosnian Serbs by participating in the conflict,' and Croatia has
troops fighting on behalf of the Bosnian Croats." As both the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic have declared
their independence from the former Yugoslavia, those two states appear to be engaged in an international conflict." According to the
United Nations Commission of Experts,
the character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned,
combined with the web of agreements on humanitarian issues the
parties have concluded among themselves, justify an approach
whereby it applies the law applicable in international armed conflicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia."
In sum, the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina amounts to an
international armed conflict involving the genocidal use of rape.
Though not an internationally recognized state, the terms of the Genocide Convention bind the Federal Republic. Characterizing both the

24. Feryal Gharabi, Equality Now, Address at Smith College (Apr. 15, 1993).
25. HELSINIU WATCH, supra note 10, at 35.

26. 15 Killed in a Barrage of Shelling Across Sarajevo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1994,
at A4.
27. HELSnqi WATCH. supra note 10, at 199-200.
28. Letter Dated 9 February 1993 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR at 14, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993) [hereinafter U.N. Experts Report]; see also Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, Representa-

tive of the United States of America to the United Nations, to Boutros BoutrosGhali, Secretary-General of the United Nations 6 (Apr. 5, 1993) (on file with author)
(for jurisdictional purposes, the conflict shall be deemed to be of an international

character). But see Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 16 (1993) [hereinafter
S.G. Report] (the selection of January 1, 1993 as the starting date for temporal
jurisdiction of war crimes tribunal is not intended to convey any judgment as to the
international or internal character of the conflict).
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war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an international armed conflict and
the mass rape of Muslim women and children as genocide has important legal ramifications.
II. INHERENT DEFECTS IN FORA AVAILABLE TO BRING PERPETRATORS
OF RAPE TO JUSTICE
Two types of fora may have jurisdiction over perpetrators of rape
in Bosnia and Herzegovina: national courts, including Bosnian and
United States courts, and international tribunals.' However, the
available tribunals have inherent defects that diminish their power to
compensate victims and deter perpetrators. While domestic initiations
of criminal prosecutions and domestic court adjudications of civil
claims will elicit charges of nationalistic prejudice or political influence, the only available international forum - the International Court
of Justice - cannot prosecute individual perpetrators. As a result,
many obstacles prevent the victims of rape from obtaining relief in the
currently available fora.
A. Bosnian Courts
At first glance, the Bosnian court system provides the most obvious forum for the victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under
the territoriality "' and passive personality" principles of international jurisdiction, a state has jurisdiction to define and punish crimes
committed on its territory or against its nationals. In fact, according to
Article VI of the Genocide Convention, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the
only state required to try those who have perpetrated genocide within
its territory. 2 Similarly, Article 5(1) of the U.N. Convention Against

Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun29. Another potential forum would be a regional tribunal, but the former Yugoslavia was not a party to any of the regional tribunals. If Bosnia and Herzegovina
were to become a party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted Nov. 4, 1959, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1953), Article 25(1) provides that the European Human Rights
Commission "may receive petitions .. . from any person ... or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of
the rights set forth in this Convention" as long as the allegedly offending Party

recognizes the competence of the European Human Rights Commission to receive
such petitions. Id. at 236-237. Thus, through this mechanism, the Bosnian victims of
rape could bring a claim only against the Federal Republic rather than against individual perpetrators. Moreover, their claims would only be entertained if the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia had accepted the jurisdiction of the European Human Rights

Commission.
30. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §402 (1Xa)-(b) (1987).
31. Id. § 402 cmt. g.
32. See Genocide Convention, supra note 17, at 280-82 (persons charged with

genocide shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which
the act was committed or by such international penal tribunal as shall have jurisdiction).
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ishment ("Convention Against Torture") obligates a state party to take
the necessary measures to establish jurisdiction over an offense committed in any territory subject to that state party's jurisdiction.'
As a party to the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War ("Fourth Geneva Convention"),8 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has an obligation to
prosecute any offense that qualifies as a grave breach of that Convention.' Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires each
High Contracting Party "to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and [to]
bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts. " ' Bosnia and Herzegovina can thus prosecute grave offenses
committed by Serbian forces, for as a High Contracting Party, the
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention bind the Federal Republic."1
Attempts to use the Bosnian court system to prosecute the perpetrators of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina would encounter many practical problems, however. In the occupied regions, legal institutions
generally do not function, and "the situation of all-out or avowed war
prevailing in the... territories [of the former Yugoslavia] rules out
any possibility of effective prosecution."' Even if the Bosnian legal
system operated effectively, the international community would doubt
the legitimacy of Bosnian trials of Serbian prisoners.' As with the
trial of Adolf Eichmann, despite the horrific nature of the allegations

33. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 177, 178 (1988). Article
14 goes even further, requiring that each state party ensure in its legal system that
the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair
and adequate compensation. Id. at 181. Although the Socialist Federal Republic was
a party to the Torture Convention, it is not clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina has
succeeded to its obligations.
34. Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention]. Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its succession to the Four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the two Protocols of 1977 on December 12, 1992. See European Investigative Report, supra note 20, at 17.
35. For an explanation of why rape qualifies as a grave breach of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, see infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
36. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, at 386.
37. See HELSINKI WATCH, supra note 10, at 201 (The desire of the Federal Republic to be recognized as a successor state to the former Yugoslavia and thus retain membership in international organizations implies a willingness to succeed to
the international agreements to which former Yugoslavia was a party. The former
Yugoslavia ratified the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1950.).
38. Letter Dated 10 February 1993 From the Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, at 12, U.N.
Doc. S/25266 (1993) [hereinafter French Proposal].
39. Interview with Mijan Damaska, Ford Foundation Professor of Law, Yale
University, New Haven, May 4, 1993 [hereinafter Damaska Interview].
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and the desire to believe the accused guilty, suspicion would remain as
to the impartiality of the proceedings.'
For example, some have already raised questions about the fairness of the much-publicized trial of two Serbian soldiers in Bosnia and
Herzegovina." Bosnian army forces arrested the two soldiers in
Sarajevo in November 1991, and one of the soldiers, Borislav Herak,
confessed immediately.' However, other than Herak's detailed confession, it remains unclear why the Bosnians singled these two soldiers
out from the vast pool of potential defendants. ' At trial, the defense
claimed inducement of the soldiers' confessions by beatings and pointed to the lack of independent verification for most of the crimes.' After a twelve-day trial on charges of murder, rape, and genocide, the
soldiers were found guilty and sentenced to death by firing squad.'
B. United States Courts
Victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina can pursue civil remedies in the courts of the United States under two statutes.' The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 provides victims of torture or extrajudicial killing with a private cause of action for damages."7 Victims
of any nationality have standing if the alleged offender acted under
"actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation."
Moreover, the statute's definition of torture, which includes "any act,
directed against an individual in the offender's custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purpose as ... in-

40. For a discussion of the criticisms of the Eichmann trial, see infra text accompanying notes 244-48.
41. See John F. Burns, 2 Serbs to Be Shot for Killings and Rapes, N.Y. TIoEs,

Mar. 31, 1993, at A6.
42. Bosnia War Crimes (COURT TV television broadcast, May 5, 1993)(Video-tape
on file with author).

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Burns, supra note 41.
46. At least two suits against Radovan Karadzic, President of the internationally
unrecognized Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are currently pending in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See, e.g., Kadic
v. Karadzic, No. 93-1163 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 2, 1993); Doe v. Karadzic, No. 930878 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11, 1993). In response to each complaint, the defendant

filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Memorandum in Support of a Motion to Dismiss on
May 10, 1993.
47. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992). The Act defines "extrajudicial killing" as 'a deliberated killing not authorized
by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.' Id. §
3(a).

48. Id. § 2(a).
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timidating or coercing that individual,"' would include rape.
The Alien Tort Statute grants United States district courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' As
the Ninth Circuit succinctly explained in Tcjano v. Marcos, the Alien
Tort Statute "requires a claim by an alien, a tort, and a violation of
international law." 1 In Trajano, for example, the court found that the
Alien Tort Statute provided the district court with subject matter jurisdiction over a claim by a Philippine national that her son had been
tortured to death in the Philippines by military intelligence personnel
acting under the authority of then-president Ferdinand Marcos, the
defendant. Since both official torture and genocide violate international
law,"2 the Alien Tort Statute would allow the victims of rape in
Bosnia and Herzegovina to bring a civil action in the district courts of
the United States.
United States courts have awarded damages under the Alien Tort
Statute to foreign plaintiffs,' but many hurdles impede the path to
relief. The obstacles to obtaining a favorable judgment fall into the
following ten doctrinal categories: (1) personal and subject matter
jurisdiction; (2) service of process; (3) forum non conveniena, (4) failure
to state a claim; (5) standing; (6) diplomatic or foreign sovereign immu49. Id. § 3(bX1).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
51. 978 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992).
52. The circuits are in agreement that official torture is a violation of international law. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("it would be unthinkable to conclude other than that acts of official torture violate customary international law); Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941-42 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (torture constitutes violation of jus cogens); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1980) ("for purposes of civil liability, thi torturer has become - like the pirate and
slave trader before him - hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind*); see
also 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702(d) (state violates international law if as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones torture
or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment).
Genocide is also a violation of customary international law. See id. § 702(a)
(state violates international law if as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones genocide). In addition, since 1987, the United States has been a
party to the Genocide Convention. Article I of the Convention states that The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide .. . is a crime under international law which
they undertake to prevent and punish.' See Genocide Convention, supra note 17, at
280.
53. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (awarding plaintiffs
$10,364,000 in damages); 7Tcjano, 978 F.2d at 496 (upholding award to plaintiffs of
$4.16 million in damages); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(awarding $8 million in damages); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No.
CV 82-1772 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (awarding $2.7 million in damages), rev'd and
remanded Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Argentina may have implicitly waived immunity), cert. denied, Republic of Argentina
v. Siderman de Blake, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
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nity; (7) nonjusticiability under the Act of State or the political question doctrines; (8) discovery; (9) attachment of assets; and (10) enforcement of judgments." The Torture Victim Protection Act removes only
one of these hurdles, subject matter jurisdiction,' while adding two
more, exhaustion of remedies and a ten-year statute of limitations.'
Moreover, the Torture Victim Protection Act has yet to be tested in
U.S. courts.8 7
Several Bosnian victims of rape have brought suits in federal
district court against the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan
Karadzic. These suits raise numerous questions regarding the availability of U.S. courts to Bosnian victims: Do U.S. courts have personal
jurisdiction over someone who comes to the United States only for
short periods of time to negotiate a peace settlement?' As an invitee
of the United Nations for peace negotiations," can Karadzic be served
with process?' Is service on his bodyguards sufficient?"' Is there an

54. See generally Harold H. Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting
Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEX INT'L L.J. 169, 18183 (1987).

55. An individual who subjects an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing

"shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages." Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, §
2(a) (2) (1992).
56. Id. § 2(b) & (c).
57. Although no one has litigated the Torture Victim Protection Act, it has been
briefed. However, the arguments primarily revolve around questions of retroactivity
and the availability of punitive damages. See Supplemental Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motions for Default Judgment at 16-30,
Xuncax v. Gramajo, F. Supp. (Mass. 1994) (No. 91-11564 WD).
58. The due process clause prohibits the exercise of personal jurisdiction unless a
defendant has minimum contacts with the forum. See Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (no personal jurisdiction where defendant
lacked continuous and systematic contacts with forum and contacts were unrelated
to cause of action). Even if minimum contacts are present, the court will not "unreasonably" exercise jurisdiction. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480
U.S. 102, 144 (1987) ('The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself
in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.").
59. See Letter from Robert A. Bradtke, Acting Assistant Secretary of Legislative
Affairs, Dep't of State, to Senator Dole, Mar. 1993 (on file with author) [hereinafter
Bradtke Letter] (Karadzic in U.S. solely as an invitee of U.N.).
60. Within the U.N. headquarters district, Karadzic can only be served "with the
consent of and under conditions approved by the Secretary-General." United Nations
Headquarters Agreement, 22 U.S.C. § 287, art. I, § 9 (1988). Such consent has not
been given for service of process on Karadzic. In addition, Karadzic might be able to
argue that his presence in New York is similar to that of a witnesses entering a
state from another jurisdiction to testify at a trial. Under such circumstances, witnesses are immune from service of process. 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1076 (1987); see also Stewart v.
Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 129 (1916) (suitors and witnesses coming from another state
or jurisdiction cannot be served with civil process while in court and "during a reasonable time coming and going").
61. Reportedly, Karadzic's bodyguards have prevented direct service of process in
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adequate alternative forum?' Have the plaintiffs
available, alternative remedies?. Can the suit be
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bX6) for lack of a
Will Karadzic be immune under a theory of official

exhausted their
dismissed under
cause of action?"
immunity?" Un-

Kadic v. Karadzic, No. 93-1163 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 2, 1993). Damaska Interview,
supra note 39.
62. In determining whether to dismiss a suit on the basis of forum non conveniens, the district court enjoys a high level of discretion in considering whether an
alternative forum exists; whether the plaintiffs choice of forum deserves deference;
and the private and public interests involved. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235, 255-61 (1982); see also In re Union Carbide Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). There is no presumption in favor of the choice of forum of
an alien plaintiff. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 256. However, "if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is
no remedy at all . .. the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in
the interests of justice." Id. at 254 (emphasis added); see also Jeffrey M. Blum &
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over InternationalHuman Rights Claims:
The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,22 HARV. INT. L.J. 53, 104
(1981) (issue of forum non conveniens will consistently arise in § 1350 cases due to
expense of obtaining witnesses and evidence, unavailability of compulsory process,
and involvement of law of foreign state).
63. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 requires the claimant to exhaust
his or her "adequate and available" remedies in the place where the alleged acts
occurred. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, § 2(b) (1992). The court may be persuaded that no adequate remedies are available to victims of rape in Bosnia and
Herzegovina because their country is currently engaged in war.
64. In Trajano v. Marcos, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
that the Alien Tort Statute confers jurisdiction but provides no cause of action. 978
F.2d 493, 503 n.22 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (§ 1350 does not supply a cause
of action). Although the Trajano court also confirmed the theory that a private right
of action cannot be implied from a non-self-executing treaty, it found a cause of
action under municipal tort law for torture. Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d at 503; see
also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808 (Bork, J., concurring) (non-self-executing treaties do
not create privately enforceable rights). But see Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INTL L. 760 (1988) (distinction between non-self-executing and selfexecuting treaties patently inconsistent with express language of Constitution).
To sustain a claim for torture, plaintiffs must show that Karadzic acted under
official authority or under color of such authority. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791-95
(Edwards, J., concurring). Paradoxically, if Karadzic can demonstrate that he was
acting in his official capacity as an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state, he
may be immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1991); infra notes 65 and 69.
65. Although the executive branch has stated that it will not accord Karadzic
immunity on a discretionary basis, it has not ruled out the possibility that either a
treaty or customary international law will confer immunity on Karadzic. Bradtke
Letter, supra note 59; cf Lafontante v. Aristide, Civ. No. 93-4268 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(defendant absolutely immune from personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts because U.S.
government recognizes him as official head-of-state of Haiti and immunity has not
been waived by statute or by Haiti). In Chuidian v. Phillipine National Bank, the
government expressed the view that an individual acting in his official capacity as
an employee of a foreign sovereign would be entitled to immunity under general
principles of sovereign immunity. 912 F.2d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1990).
According to the U.N. Headquarters Agreement, privileges and immunities
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der the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act' ("FSIA"), do the Federal
Republic and Serbian Bosnia constitute foreign states?" Can
Karadzic claim that the Alien Tort Statute does not apply to Serbian
Bosnia? Can Karadzic claim to be an "agent or instrumentality" of
the Federal Republic? Can a waiver of immunity for Karadzic be implied if the Federal Republic is silent?" Under the Act of State Doc-

must be extended to representatives of U.N. members not recognized by the U.S. if
they are within the headquarters district or in transit between the district and their
residences or offices. 22 U.S.C. § 287, art. V, § 15(4) (1992). The question is whether
Karadzic qualifies as a representative of a U.N. member.
66. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1988). The FSIA provides foreign states with
blanket immunity subject to specified exceptions. Id. § 1604. The FSIA is the sole
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
67. Under international law, qualification as a nation-state requires a people, a
definite territorial unit, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with
other states. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 n.21 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring). Karadzic is currently negotiating in the United
Nations as the representative of the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs have an 82member parliament composed of 'ardent nationalists, militia leaders and local political bosses." Stephen Kinzer, Bosnia's Serbs Weigh a Familiar Choice, N.Y TIMES,
May 5, 1993, at A17.
68. As the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Karadzic may be able to claim that he
is implementing the policies of a non-state organization and thus does not fall within the jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (alien tort statute does not cover torture by non-state actors such as the
PLO); see generally Kenneth C. Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute
and a Recommendation, N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL 473, 503-507 (1986) (analyzing
PLO's legal personality).
69. Agents or instrumentalities of foreign states are immune under the FSIA. 28
U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1993). The Ninth Circuit has held that individuals acting in their
official capacity may qualify as "agents or instrumentalities.* See Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990); see also First National Citibank
v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983) (presumption
that foreign sovereign is distinct from its instrumentalities may be overcome either
by principal/agent relationship or if allowing distinction would work fraud or injustice).
70. If a foreign state has explicitly or implicitly waived its immunity, the FSIA
does not bar prosecution. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(1) (1993). In cases involving a crime like
systematic rape, when states have an interest in denying that an actor was acting
as an agent of their government, an explicit waiver is less likely. See Blum &
Steinhardt, supra note 62, at 106. The Federal Republic has publicly attempted to
distance itself from the conflict in Bosnia. See Stephen Kinzer, Belgrade Denounces
Sanctions; Calls for Meeting, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 29, 1993, at A7 (statement by
Yugoslavia's deputy U.N. representative that 'Yugoslavia is not a party to the conflict
in Bosnia-Herzegovina'). However, unless the Federal Republic explicitly waives
immunity, it may be difficult for the court to find an implied waiver. Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 722 (9th Cir. 1992) (direct connection
between sovereign's activities in U.S. courts and plaintiffs' claims for relief necessary
to support finding of implied waiver), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3682 (1993). But see
Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA. A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REV.
365 (1989) (violation of international law by foreign state should be viewed as implied waiver).
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trine, should the Federal Republic and Serbian Bosnia be considered
as recognized foreign sovereigns?"1 Will the Federal Republic claim
immunity for Karadzic on the basis of the Act of State Doctrine?'
Does Karadzic have any assets in the United States? Can the court attach the assets of the Federal Republic?" And finally, if judgment
were entered against Karadzic, would it be enforceable?7'
Even if the victims of rape successfully clear all these hurdles - a
remote prospect, at best - they would still be unlikely to actually
receive monetary compensation. Few defendants have substantial monetary assets in the United States, and even fewer would come to the
United States and deposit funds in American banks knowing the attachment power of a court order. Thus, the victims are unlikely to receive restitution."'
A monetary judgment entered against the perpetrators of rape
would have the positive effects of affirmatively enunciating a legal
norm and would dramatically restrict the ability of the defendants to

71. The Act of State Doctrine allows courts to declare a case nonjusticiable if it
involves an examination of the validity of an action taken by a foreign sovereign,
recognized by the United States, in the absence of a treaty or other controlling legal
principle. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); see
also W.S. Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990)
('Act of State Doctrine does not establish an exception for cases and controversies
that may embarrass foreign' governments, but merely requires that, in the process of
deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns within their own jurisdictions shall be
deemed valid.*). The intricacies surrounding the question whether the Federal Republic is a recognized foreign sovereign are reflected in its current United Nations
status. See Section I, supra.
72. Karadzic may be able to rely on the Act of State Doctrine by claiming that
the rapes that occurred under his orders were part of the Serbian policy of "ethnic
cleansing." See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993) (unlawful detention
and torture by Saudi government are sovereign activities and thus immune from
jurisdiction); Andrew M. Scoble, Comment, Enforcing the Customary International
Law of Human Rights in Federal Court, 74 CAL. L REV. 127, 174 (1986) (police
chief who follows express governmental policy of torturing prisoners may be able to
plead Act of State defense if his nation is willing to claim it for him); see also
Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge
of Honor, 83 AM. J. INTL L. 461, 492 (1989) (Act of State Doctrine applies if defendant official can establish direct chain of command authorizing his acts).
73. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611 (1988) (property of foreign state in United States
immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, unless state has
waived immunity from attachment or certain commercial exceptions to immunity
apply).
74. In order to enforce a judgment, a separate proceeding must be brought to
obtain a writ of execution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a). Such a proceeding would give the
court an opportunity to grant Karadzic relief from judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(bX4) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
75. But see Harold H. Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE LJ.
2347, 2368 (1991) (many plaintiffs have expressed satisfaction simply to have won
default judgments announcing that defendant transgressed universally recognized
norms of international law).
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visit the United States."5 However, the attenuated possibility of such
a judgment, even with its accompanying restrictions on residence in
the United States, would not provide a sufficient deterrent to potential
perpetrators of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, perpetrators of genocidal rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot face criminal
prosecution in the United States." Finally, even if the U.S. courts
created a legal norm qualifying rape as genocide, legal fora in other
nations would not necessarily follow the U.S. precedent.
C. The Courts of Other States
According to the principle of universal jurisdiction, a state may
assert jurisdiction over a person within the state's territorial jurisdiction if he is accused of certain violations of the law of nations." These
violations include genocide and war crimes."' Furthermore, the Convention Against Torture requires any state party to either extradite
such alleged offenders to a state party that has jurisdiction under the
territoriality, nationality, or passive personality principles, or to itself

76. See ROBERT F. DRINAN, CRY OF THE OPPRESSED: THE HISTORY AND HOPE OF

THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION 56 (1987) (those charged as torturers or their accomplices would be reluctant to travel or acquire personal assets because of damages
assessed against them).
77. To implement the Genocide Convention, the U.S. enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1091,
which makes genocide criminal when committed within the United States or by a
United States national. 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (1988). As a result, the statute would
not reach aliens accused of committing genocide outside the United States.
78. See Bernhard Graefarth, Universal Criminal Jurisdiction and an International Criminal Court, 1 EUM J. INTL L. 67, 72 (1990) (noting increased international
recognition that offenses against peace and security of mankind are punishable even
when not treated as crimes under national law).
79. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987). Even if the
state is not a party to the Genocide Convention, the International Court of Justice
has declared in an advisory opinion that "the principles underlying the Convention
are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even
without any conventional obligation.' Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23
(May 28). But see WOETZEL, supra note 9, at 264 (little basis in customary international law for extension of universal principle to crimes of genocide).
Any party to the Fourth Geneva Convention has an obligation to prosecute
any offense that qualifies as a grave breach of that Convention. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36; see also WOETMEL, supra note 9, at 262 (Geneva Convention
of 1949 established universal principle of jurisdiction for ordinary war crimes); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX L. REV.
785, 817 (1988). The 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 states that
grave breaches shall be regarded as war crimes. Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 85(5), reprinted in 72 Am. J. INTL L. 457,
496 (1978).
For a discussion of why rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a grave
breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and thus a war crime, see infra notes 16870 and accompanying text.
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take jurisdiction over the alleged offender.' The Convention Against
Torture, which would cover many of the rapes in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, defines torture as
[any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as... intimidating or coercing him or a third person... inflicted

by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity."1
Therefore, any state may prosecute perpetrators of rape who venture
within its borders when the rape qualifies as either genocide, a war
crime, or official torture. Indeed, if the rape constitutes official torture,
the state must either extradite or prosecute the alleged perpetrator.
The general unwillingness to exercise universal jurisdiction remains the primary problem with relying on other states to prosecute
the perpetrators of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina.' States rarely
intercede on behalf of individuals absent a link such as nationality.'
Furthermore, a judgment reached under the principle of universal jurisdiction elicits two criticisms: (1) national bias and (2) imposition of a
different degree of punishment than another state might have administered." For example, whereas an individual convicted by a United
States jury of rape resulting in murder might receive a sentence of
death by lethal injection, many countries have refused to institute the
death penalty in similar situations.
D. InternationalCourt of Justice
Currently, the International Court of Justice ("I.C.J." or "World
Court") provides the only international tribunal open to the victims of
rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina.' According to Article 36 of the I.C.J.
Statute, the Court's jurisdiction extends to all cases the parties refer to
it and to "all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.' The I.C.J., how80. Convention Against Torture, supra note 33, at art. 5(1) & art. 8.

81. Id. art. 2.
82. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 reporter's note 1
(1987) (genocide and war crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction, but apparently
no state has ever exercised such jurisdiction); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a PriorRegime, 100 YALE
L.J. 2537, 2560 (1991) (The willingness of states to prosecute human rights viola-

tions committed outside their territory has dissipated.).
83. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 703(a) reporters' note
4 (1987).
84. Graefarth, supra note 78, at 85.
85. Although the Security Council has passed a resolution mandating the creation of an international war crimes tribunal, and has approved its statute, the

establishment of such a tribunal is in the germinative stage. See infra text accompanying notes 104-107.
86. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(1) reprinted in 39 AM.
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ever, "has failed to provide a meaningful forum... for enunciating
international human rights norms or curbing national misconduct." 7
For the victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the I.C.J.'s primary
defects stem from its jurisdictional limitations. Because only states
may bring claims before the I.C.J.,M rape victims must persuade
Bosnia and Herzegovina to espouse their claims as an essential prerequisite to the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. Even more important, the
I.C.J. can only hold states, and not individual defendants, accountable
for crimes within its jurisdiction.
On March 20, 1993, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina filed
an application with the World Court instituting proceedings against
the Federal Republic. The application alleged violations of the Genocide Convention and specifically refered to rape as "part of a calculated
plan of destruction of the Muslim people in Bosnia.' The I.C.J. responded on April 8, 1993 with provisional measures ordering the Federal Republic to "immediately... take all measures within its power
to prevent commission of the crime of genocide."' The Court based its
prima facie jurisdiction on Article IX of the Genocide Convention '
and will render a judgment on the merits after the parties fully brief
and argue the case.
The victims of rape overcame the first obstacle to relief in the
World Court when Bosnia and Herzegovina espoused their claims.'
However, Bosnia based its application to the I.C.J. solely on the Genocide Convention. Thus, if the rapes constitute war crimes, but not
genocide, the victims will not receive compensation. ' In any event,
the Court may dismiss the case for lack of standing. Two key uncertainties plague the legal position of the Republic of Bosnia and

J. INTL L. 215, 222 (1945 Supp.) [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]. In addition, any nation
that has accepted the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. can make a claim for a violation of
customary international law provided that the opposing party has also submitted to
the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. with respect to that conduct. Id. art. 36(2), at 222-23.
87. Koh, supra note 75, at 2360; see generally Stephen M. Schwebel, Human
Rights in the World Court, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 945 (1991) (discussing cases
in which I.C.J. has treated human rights questions).
88. I.C.J. Statute, supra note 86, at 222.
89. Bosnian I.C.J. Application, supra note 14, at 14.

90. I.C.J. Order, supra note 12, at 24.
91. Id. at 13. Article IX provides that "[dlisputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide .. . shall
be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the state
parties to the dispute.' Genocide Convention, supra note 17, at 282.
92. See Bosnian I.C.J. Application, supra note 14.
93. Telephone Interview with Keith Hyatt, Attorney, May 6, 1993 (noting terrible
problems associated with proving a policy of genocide); see generally Herst Hannum,

International Law and Cambodian Genocide: the Sound of Silence, 11 HUM. RTS. Q.
82, 94-112 (1989) (explaining why deliberate killings and destruction by Khmer

Rouge constitute genocide within meaning of Genocide Convention).
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Herzegovina and the Federal Republic as successor states to the former Yugoslavia. First, have the republics succeeded to the obligations
of the Genocide Convention?" Second, do both republics qualify as
states?
Only states can stand as parties to cases before the I.C.J.' In
addition, states that are not parties to the Statute usually may not
avail upon the Court." Even if the case goes to the merits, however,
the I.C.J. tends to deliver its judgments very slowly. All briefs are read
aloud, word-for-word, in the different languages of the parties. Then,
the judges take an extremely long time to write their opinions. Further, the World Court does not rely on precedent, so it must approach
each case completely afresh. Finally, even if the Court enters a judgment, it will not target the particular perpetrators of rape but will
instead sanction the Federal Republic as a whole. Any compensation
will, at least initially, go to the national coffers of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, rather than to the individual victims.
The negligible effect of the I.C.J.'s provisional measures in the
Bosnia case demonstrates another problem with the I.C.J.: noncompliance.' If a state objects to the World Court's exercise of jurisdiction,
it will usually refuse to appear or to comply with the judgment rendered," and though the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security Council
to enforce I.C.J. judgments, the Council has never done so." Security
Council action is especially unlikely with respect to proceedings arising
out of the conflict in Bosnia due to Russia's ties to the Federal Republic."° Given these impediments to enforcement, Bosnia and
Herzegovina will likely never obtain monetary reparations from the
Federal Republic, and the victims may never receive restitution.

94. For an explanation of why this question should be answered in the affirmative, see Section I, supra.

95. 1.C.J. Statute, supra note 86, at 222.
96. But see id. at 223 (noting the conditions under which states that are not
parties may access the I.C.J.).
97. No change in the policy of "ethnic cleansing" has been reported since the
I.C.J. ordered the Federal Republic to take all necessary measures to prevent genocide. Similarly, Iran ignored the I.C.J.'s order to release immediately the American
hostages held in Tehran. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(U.S. v. Tehran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
98. Richard B. Bilder, Lecture: The United States and the World Court in the
Post-'Cold War" Era, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 251, 258 (1991).
99. Charter of the United Nations, adopted June 26, 1945, art. 94(2), reprinted in
39 AM. J. INT'L L. 190, 210 (Supp. 1945) [hereinafter U.N. Charter] (if a party to a
case fails to perform obligations required by a judgment rendered by the I.C.J., the
other party may have recourse to Security Council). The United States vetoed a
Security Council resolution calling it to comply with the judgment in the Nicaragua
case. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). See Bilder, supra note 98, at 255.
100. I.C.J. Order, supra note 12, at 26-27.
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In sum, the domestic fora currently available to victims of rape in
Bosnia and Herzegovina suffer from either nationalistic prejudice or
various procedural obstacles making judgment on the merits unlikely.
Of the nine characteristics necessary for an effective forum,"1
Bosnian courts suffer especially in terms of partiality. While more impartial, U.S. courts are unlikely to reach judgment on the merits, and
their judgments are not enforceable. Monetary judgments may restrict
perpetrators' opportunities to live in the United States but will not
restrain the personal liberty of the perpetrators. Moreover, norms
issued by domestic fora do not bind other countries; a decision issued
by a U.S. court, for example, has no precedential value in Bosnia.
The inadequacies of the domestic fora leave the victims of rape in
Bosnia and Herzegovina with an international tribunal, the I.C.J.
However, the I.C.J. does not allow individual access to prosecution,
and its judgments are not timely or enforceable. Therefore, the time
has come for a new international tribunal, which can better fulfill the
nine criteria for an effective forum. The only remaining question is
whether the new forum should take the form of an ad hoc or a permanent international court. Section III discusses the merits of an ad hoc
war crimes tribunal, and Section IV evaluates the proposals for a permanent international criminal court.
III. ESTABLISHING AN AD HOC WAR CRIMES TRrBUNAL

A war crimes tribunal with jurisdiction over crimes committed in
the former Yugoslavia has many advantages over the fora currently
available to the victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prosecuting the perpetrators of rape in an international arena increases the
likelihood of impartial trials and potentially provides the victims with
a forum able to respond to their claims. Establishment of a war crimes
tribunal must occur as soon as possible. If a tribunal quickly prosecutes those responsible, it may deter future atrocities.' In addition,
it will reassure victims that the international community will hear
them and not forget them."°
Progress toward the establishment of a war crimes tribunal has
already begun. On February 22, 1993, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 808, stating "that an international tribunal
shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the ter-

101. The following nine criteria were enumerated at the beginning of this article:
(1) individual access to prosecution; (2) impartiality; (3) decisions based on law; (4)
depoliticization; (5) precedential value of judgments; (6) likelihood of resolution on

the merits; (7) enforceability of judgments; (8) timeliness; and (9) flexibility of procedures.
102. See French Proposal, supra note 38, at 5.

103. Id.
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ritory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. " '°4 In accordance with
Resolution 808, the Secretary-General submitted a report on the mechanics and implementation of such a tribunal to the Security Council
("S.G.'s Report"). ° On May 25, 1993, the Security Council unanimously voted in favor of Resolution 827, which approves the S.G.'s
Report and adopts its annex, the "Statute of the International Tribunal.""° Although the vote was unanimous, several members of the
Security Council expressed "understandings" of specific articles of the
Statute."°7 These understandings affect any interpretation of the
Statute.
The S.G.'s Report concludes that, because of time pressure, the
Security Council and not an international treaty should establish the
war crimes tribunal."° In accordance with the Secretary-General's
recommendations, Resolution 827 acts under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations ("U.N. Charter")' to formally create the
tribunal. By establishing the tribunal under Chapter VII, the Security
Council can take enforcement measures against member states that
hinder the tribunal's work.
Previous resolutions adopted by the Security Council will facilitate
the investigative work of the war crimes tribunal. In August 1992,
Resolution 771 called for an end to the breaches of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and requested states, international humanitarian organizations, and the Secretary-General to
collate substantiated information on such violations." Two months
later, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish an impartial Commission of Experts to examine and analyze the
information gathered."' Based on the first interim report of the Commission of Experts, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali concluded that
"grave breaches and other violations of international humanitarian law
have been committed, including ...

rape." 2 The Secretary-General's

explicit reference to rape as a grave breach provides hope of prosecution of the perpetrators of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the

104. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993) (emphasis added).
105. See S.G. Report, supra note 28.
106. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993) [hereinafter S.C. Res.

827].
107. See generally Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting, U.N. SCOR S/PV.3217, at 16-17 (May 25, 1933) here-

inafter Meeting 3217].
108. S.G. Report, supra note 28, at 7-8.
109. U.N. Charter, supra note 99, at 199-202. Chapter VII gives the Security
Council the power to take measures to maintain or restore international peace and
security once it has determined the existence of any threat of the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression.
110. S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992).
111. S.C. Res. 789, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/789 (1992).
112. S.G. Report, supra note 28, at 1.
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war crimes tribunal."'

This section begins with a discussion of the Report of the Secretary-General, which covers three principal topics: (1) the mechanics of
the tribunal, including procedural protections for defendants; (2) the
theory of individual liability for defendants brought before the tribunal; and (3) the scope of the tribunal's jurisdiction. The manner in
which the S.G.'s Report addresses these three topics has important
ramifications on the effectiveness of the tribunal with regard to the
victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, lessons lie in
the only precedents for an international war crimes tribunal, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. This section concludes, however, that
while the war crimes tribunal takes a step in the right direction, as an
ad hoc body it possesses inherent defects that a permanent international criminal court would ameliorate.
A. The Mechanics of the War Crimes Tribunal
According to the Statute of the International Tribunal (the "Statute"), the war crimes tribunal will sit at the Hague"" and will consist
of eleven independent judges, six of whom will sit in two Trial Chambers with three members each, and five of whom will serve in the Appeals Chamber.1 5 In September, 1993, the General Assembly selected the eleven judges from a list prepared by the Security Council.1
No two of the judges may be nationals of the same state,"' and the
list must take account of the adequate representation of the major
legal systems of the world.'18 The Secretary-General invited both
U.N. member states and non-member states maintaining permanent
1
to nominate two candiobserver missions at U.N. headquarters"
dates, but the nominees could not be of the same nationality.' The
judges will serve renewable four-year terms"l and will elect a President, who will be a member of the Appeals Chamber.' The eleven
judges began drafting the tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence in
November 1993.'
113. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.

114. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 31, at 47; cf. S.C. Res. 827, supra
note 106, at 2 (determination of seat of war crimes tribunal subject to conclusion of
appropriate arrangements between the United Nations and the Netherlands).
115. See id., supra note 28, Annex, art. 12, at 40.
116. Id. art. 13(2Xd), at 41. The judges are nationals of Costa Rica, Canada, Italy, Egypt, China, France, Malaysia, Pakistan, Australia, Nigeria, and the United

States. See Julia Preston, U.N. Elects 11 Judges for War Crimes Court, WASH. POsT,
Sept. 18, 1993, at A15.
117. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 12, at 40.
118. Id. Annex, art. 13(2Xc), at 41.
119. Id. Annex, art. 13(2Xa), at 41.
120. Id. Annex, art. 13(2Xb), at 41.
121. Id. Annex, art. 13(4), at 41.
122. Id. Annex, art. 14(1) & (2), at 41.
123. Paul Lewis, Somalia and Bosnia; Justice U.N.-Style Moves Onward, Half.
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The Security Council will appoint an independent Prosecutor to
perform the investigatory and prosecutorial tasks of the tribunal.'
The Prosecutor can recommend necessary subordinates for appointment by the Secretary-General.'2 Victims of rape may bring their
claims to the attention of the Prosecutor, whose powers include investigating allegations, questioning suspects and victims, examining witnesses, requesting arrest warrants, issuing indictments, and prosecuting individuals.'
According to the Statute, the Prosecutor may issue an indictment
once he or she determines that a prima facie case exists." One of
the judges of the Trial Chamber reviews and confirms the indictment
before the Trial Chamber can issue orders for the arrest, detention,
surrender, or transfer of the accused.us The Statute obligates states
to attempt to arrest, detain, and transfer the accused to the custody of
the tribunal.'2 Because orders for the surrender or transfer of an accused are "considered to be the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,"' the Security Council may take appropriate action, whether in the form of provisional measures, economic sanctions, or armed force, to ensure cooperation in the extradition of suspects to the tribunal. States must also
provide assistance to the Prosecutor and Trial Chamber with respect
to, inter alia, the identification and location of persons, the production
of evidence, and service of court documents. 1
Once arrested and taken into custody, the accused has the right to
immediate information, in a language he understands, of the nature
and cause of the charge against him.' As soon as the accused is before the Trial Chamber,' the Trial Chamber must read the indictment, satisfy itself that the rights of the accused are being respected,
confirm that the accused understands the indictment, and instruct the

Heartedly, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1993, § 4, at 2.
124. The Security Council unanimously appointed Venezuela's Attorney General,
Ramon Escovar-Salom, to be the Chief Prosecutor on October 21, 1993, but he resigned in early February 1994, to take a post as minister of justice in his own country. Chief Prosecutor for War-Crimes Tribunal Abandons His Post, THE GAZETTE

(MONTREAL), Feb. 4,1994, at A7. A new Chief Prosecutor has yet to be appointed.
125. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 16(4) & 16(5), at 42.
126. Id. Annex, art. 16(1), at 42; Annex, art. 18(2), at 43.
127. Id. Annex, art. 18(4), at 43. According to the U.S. Representative to the
U.N., the existence of a prima facie case means a "reasonable basis to believe" that
a crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal has been committed by the person
named in the indictment. See Meeting 3217, supra note 107, at 16-17.
128. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 19, at 43.
129. Id. Annex, art. 29, at 47.
130. Id. Annex, art. 28, at 31.
131. Id. Annex, art. 18(2), at 43; Annex, art. 29, at 47.
132. Id. Annex, art. 20(2), at 44.
133. Trials in absentia are prohibited. Id. Annex, art. 21(4Xd), at 44.
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accused to enter a plea.' Although the Statute presumes the accused innocent until proven guilty and may not compel him to testify
against himself or to confess,' it does not provide any standard of
proof at trial. The accused has a right to the services of an interpreter,
to have enough time to prepare a defense, to examine the witnesses
against him, and to subpoena witnesses on his own behalf.' An indigent defendant must be provided with legal assistance." 7 When a
national court has already tried an individual, the Trial Chamber can
exercise jurisdiction provided that either the national court characterized the act as an ordinary crime, or the crime was not diligently prosecuted before an impartial tribunal."M
Judgment of the accused requires a majority vote of the Trial
Chamber, 8 and opinions must be in writing."4 If the Trial Chamber convicts the accused and orders incarceration, it chooses the place
of imprisonment from a list of states that have volunteered .to imprison
those convicted."" In determining the length of imprisonment, the
Trial Chamber must consider the general practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia."' The Trial Chamber must also take into account the extent to which any penalty imposed on the convicted individual by a national court for the same act
has already been served." The Statute opposes the use of the death
penalty.' "
Once convicted, an individual can appeal on the following
grounds: "(a) an error on a question of law invalidating the decision; or
(b) an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.""
In addition, if a new fact comes to light that would have been a decisive factor in reaching the judgment, but was not discovered at the
time of the proceedings before either the Trial or Appeals Chamber,
the convicted person may submit an application for review of the judgment to the tribunal.'" If, pursuant to the law of the state of incarceration of the convicted person, he is eligible for pardon or commutation of sentence, the state concerned shall notify the tribunal, and the
President of the tribunal will "decide the matter on the basis of the

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Annex, art. 20(3), at 44.
Annex, art. 21, at 44.
Annex, art. 10(2), at 40.
Annex, art. 23(2), at 45.
Annex, art. 27, at 46.
Annex, art. 24(1), at 45.

143. Id. Annex, art. 10(3), at 40.
144. Id. Annex, art. 24(1), at 45.

145. Id. Annex, art. 25(1), at 46.
146. Id. Annex, art. 26, at 46.
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interests of justice and the general principles of law."" '
B. Theories of Individual Liability
Mirroring the charter that established the Nuremberg Tribunal
(the "Nuremberg Charter"), the Statute of the International Tribunal
states that an individual acting under orders from his superiors is not
thereby free of responsibility for a crime; rather, acting under orders
can be a mitigating factor in sentencing.' 8 However, the U.S. understanding of the Statute provides an additional defense to prosecution,
allowing the offender to claim that "he or she did not know the orders
were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding
would not have known the orders to be unlawful.""" The Statute subjects a military or political superior to individual liability if the illegal
acts were committed pursuant to his plan, instigation, or order."W
The superior also faces individual liability if he knew or should have
known of the violations and did not take necessary and reasonable
steps to prevent them or to punish the offenders.' Individual liability for superiors extends up to and includes heads of state. 2 Finally,
those who aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution
of any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal are individually
responsible for such crimes.'"
Thus, if Karadzic issues a policy of systematic rape of Muslim
women and girls, the actual rapist, the commanders discharging the
order, and Karadzic himself are all subject to prosecution before the
war crimes tribunal. The Nuremberg Tribunal tried the Nazi
defendents on a similar basis. Although none of the eighteen convicted
at Nuremberg of war crimes and/or crimes against humanity personally committed any crimes against individuals, the Nuremberg Tribunal determined them guilty either of ordering the crimes or of being
aware of their commission and doing nothing to stop the offenders.'
Several defendants asserted a superior orders defense, but the
Nuremberg Tribunal generally did not consider the superior orders
defense a mitigating factor."6

147. See id. Annex, art. 28, at 46.
148. Compare 82 U.N.T.S. 284, art. 8, at 288 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]
with S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 7(4), at 39.
149. Meeting 3217, supra note 107, at 16.

150. S.G. Report, aupra note 28, Annex, art. 7(1) at 38.
151. Id. Annex, art. 7(3), at 39.
152. Id. Annex, art. 7(2), at 39.

153. Id. Annex, art. 7(1), at 38.
154. See generally The Nuremberg Trial: 1946, 6 F.R.D. 69, 147-187 (1947) (describing charges and verdicts against Nuremberg defendants).

155. Id.
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C. Subject MatterJurisdictionof the War Crimes Tribunal
The threshold issue for the victims of rape in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is whether rape qualifies as a crime within the tribunal's
jurisdiction. The Statute of the International Tribunal provides the
tribunal with jurisdiction over individuals accused of the following
crimes: (1) crimes against humanity (defined as acts of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts directed against any civilian population during an armed
conflict, whether international or internal in character); (2) genocide;
(3) violations of the laws and customs of war; and (4) grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of

1 9 4 9 .'M

The Statute limits jurisdiction to

crimes committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991.57

Therefore, the Statute explicitly states that when directed against
any civilian population during an armed conflict, rape qualifies as a
crime against humanity falling within the tribunal's jurisdiction.
France, the United States, and Russia expressed the understanding
that to constitute crimes against humanity, acts must be committed
within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population for national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious reasons." Most of the rapes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina meet
these conditions. The women and girls held in "rape camps" or detained until they could no longer have abortions also have claims of
enslavement and imprisonment. In addition, any of the rapes committed against Bosnian Muslims that were part of a systematic ethnic or
religious attack qualify as genocide.'
Furthermore, rape is a violation of the laws and customs of war.
In modern times, the prohibition of rape in connection with war stems
from the "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field" ("Lieber's Code"), promulgated in 1863."w The
1899 Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War and the
1907 Hague Regulations, while not specifically mentioning women,
require that "family honour and rights.., must be protected."''
S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, arts. 2-5, at 36-38 (emphasis added).
Id. Annex, art. 1, at 36.
See Meeting 3217, supra note 107, at 11, 16, 45.
See Section I, supra.
See Theodore Meron, Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, 86
AM. J. INTL L. 1, 30 (1992); see also YOUGINDRA KHUSHALANi, DIGNrrY AND HONOuR
OF WOMEN AS BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (1982) (Lieber's Code
declared all rape by American soldiers to be prohibited under penalty of death or
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

other severe punishment).
161. Law and Customs of War on Land (Hague 11), July 29, 1899, art. 46, reprinted in 1 CHARLES I. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 247, 260 (1968); 1907 Regulations
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Surely rape qualifies as a violation of "family honour."'" After World
War I, the commission created by the Paris Peace Conference to report

on breaches of the laws and customs of war prepared a list of war
crimes that included both rape and the "abduction of girls and women
for the purpose of enforced prostitution."'" At Nuremberg, although

rape was not specifically charged in the indictment of the major war
criminals,' the prosecutors used captured German documents evidencing the routine use of rape as part of the case against some defen-

dants." By the end of World War II, rape was already established as
a violation of the laws and customs of war.
In the aftermath of World War II, the Fourth Geneva Convention
codified the law on the treatment of civilians in war, including women.
Instead of confining itself to a declaration of customary international

law, it "laid down new principles which [we]re to become part of that
law."'" The provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention apply to any

international armed conflict,"8 7 and the jurisdiction of the war crimes

tribunal extends specifically to "grave breaches" of the Fourth Geneva

Convention. The offenses that qualify as grave breaches include: "wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment... wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health... [or] unlawful confinement." '" In the official commentary on the Fourth Geneva Conven-

Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 46, reprinted
in BEVANS, supra at 651.
162. See KHUSHALANI, supra note 160, at 10 (Article 46 of Hague Regulations is a
mandatory provision guaranteeing women protection against rape).
163. Id. at 12; see also Remigiusz Beirzenek, War Crimes: History and Definition,
in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 563 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved
P. Nanda eds., 1973) (rape is number five on commission's list of thirty-two offenses).
164. See N.F. Chistiakov, The Question of War Crimes at the Nuremberg Tribunal,
in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (George Ginsburgs & V.N.
Kudriavtaev eds., 1990) (count one of indictment included "killing and cruel treatment of the civilian population on occupied territory").
165. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 8, at 53; see also id. at 58-61 (General Iwane
Matsui was sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East for ordering the 1937 Rape of Nanking, during which approximately 20,000
cases of rape occurred in first month of occupation); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 24
(1946) (upholding decision by an American Military Court in Manilla to detain a
Japanese World War H military commander upon finding him responsible for widespread acts of rape and other war crimes by his troops).
166. Joyce A. C. Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INTL
L. 294, 318-19 (1949).
167. Although Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that its provisions apply to war between two or more of the contracting parties, the Convention is
considered to be declaratory of customary international law and thus binding on all
states, regardless of whether they are parties to it. See KHUSHALANI, supra note 160,
at 45, 60; see also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
168. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 147, at 388. Presumably,
those who claim that rape is not a grave breach would base their argument on the
absence of any explicit reference to rape in Article 147.
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tion, the International Committee of the Red Cross elaborated on the
meaning of the phrase "inhuman treatment," stating that the "sort of
treatment covered by [Article 27] would be one which ceased to be humane."1 Article 27 declares that "[wiomen shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape,
enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.""' 0 Therefore,
any rape that takes place in an international armed conflict is a "grave
breach" of the Geneva Convention.
Although this article argues that the war in the former Yugoslavia qualifies as an international armed conflict,"' even if the war in
the former Yugoslavia is characterized as an internal conflict, Article 3
of the Fourth Geneva Convention prescribes a baseline code of conduct.
Article 3 requires that, even during internal armed conflicts, civilians
must be treated humanely and prohibits "cruel treatment and torture"
and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment.""' Thus, because Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which qualifies as one of the international instruments
setting forth the "law of war,""' prohibits rape by soldiers in time of
an internal conflict, rape falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of
the war crimes tribunal.
D. Protecting the Victims of Rape: An Evaluation of the Statute
An evaluation of the Statute for the International Tribunal from
the perspective of the victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina must

169. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: rV GENEVA
CONVENTION 598 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958). The I.C.R.C. Commentary also explains
that "wilfully causing great suffering" can legitimately include moral suffering, and
that "unlawful confinement" is internment that is not absolutely necessary for the
belligerent's security. Id. at 599. Therefore, rapes of women and girls in Bosnia and
Herzegovina qualify as several different grave breaches.
170. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 27, at 306; see also Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, art. 76, reprinted in 72 AM. J. INTL L. 457, 492 (1978).
171. See Section I, supra.
172. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 34, art. 3, at 288-89; see also Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 4(e), reprinted in 72 Am. J. Intl L. 457, 503-04 ("outrages
on personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault" are prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever).
173. KHUSHALANI, supra note 160, at 40 citing J. PICTET, 3 COMMENTARY, GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 37 (1960) (Article
3 binds insurgent forces not even in existence at time of signing by the contracting
parties). But see Raymond T. Yingling & Robert W. Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393, 396 (1952) (doubting legal efficacy of Article
3).
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examine the Statute's effectiveness at monetarily compensating the
victims and in punishing, and thus deterring, the perpetrators of rape.
As Catherine MacKinnon pointed out at the March 1993 Vancouver
Conference on the establishment of a war crimes tribunal, "the goal of
the tribunal is individual justice and holding perpetrators responsible,
and not the ends of states as such or of any state."'7 The tribunal is
likely to be effective only if it is accessible to individual victims, if
charges can be brought against the actual rapists as well as those who
ordered the rapes, and if there are adequate procedural protections
available to ameliorate the effects of resurrecting the victims' emotional trauma.
For victims of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of the most
important features of a war crimes tribunal is accessibility. To receive
compensation, victims must have access to the tribunal, which must be
equipped to calculate and distribute economic restitution. By requiring
the Prosecutor to initiate investigations on the "basis of information
obtained from any source,""" the Statute appears to allow individuals
to bring their claims to the tribunal. However, although the Statute
specifically refers to governments, U.N. organs, and intergovernmental
and non-governmental organizations, it does not explicitly mention
individual rape victims, or their representatives, as a potential source
of information. Indeed, Resolution 827 specifies that the work of the
war crimes tribunal shall be "carried out without prejudice to the right
of victims to seek, through appropriate means, compensation for damages incurred as a result of violations of international humanitarian
law,"'7 thus implying an intent to exclude civil suits from the jurisdiction of the tribunal. For example, the Statute limits the penalties
available to the tribunal to imprisonment or to requiring the return of
"any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct."7
Due to its apparent preclusion of individual civil claims, the Statute should be amended to provide for victim compensation. Resolution
827 allows victims to seek compensation "through appropriate
means."7 However, no fora are available to adequately compensate
victims. To conserve judicial resources, the Trial Chamber should adjudicate the appropriate level of compensation as well as guilt and in-

174. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Rapporteur, Notes on Session on Victims, Expert's

Meeting, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy,
Mar. 23, 1993, at 1.
175. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 18(1), at 43 (emphasis added).
176. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 106, at 2.
177. S.G. Report, asupra note 28, Annex, art. 24, at 46. But see Meeting 3217,
supra note 107, at 17 (expressing view of U.S. 'that compensation to victims by a
convicted person may be an appropriate part of decisions on sentencing, reduction of
sentences, parole or commutation*); i& at 28 (expressing view of Morocco that tribu-

nal "should not ignore appropriate compensation for victims and their families').
178. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 106, at 2.
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nocence. To enforce monetary judgments, the tribunal should call on
all participating states to assist in measures such as the attachment
and seizure of assets belonging to the defendant. If a state successfully
seizes assets in satisfaction of the judgment, the tribunal should facilitate the transfer and distribution of the money to the victims. Alternatively, the United Nations could set up a compensation commission
similar
to the one established for claims arising out of the Iraqi con17
flict. 9
Moreover, the tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence need to
guarantee the victims access to the tribunal."W The rules of procedure should specifically state that the Prosecutor shall investigate
claims brought by individual victims where the crimes charged are
within the tribunal's jurisdiction. If the Prosecutor and the Trial
Chamber judge reviewing the indictment determine that the claims
have enough merit to warrant a trial, the victims and their legal counsel should be permitted to assist in the prosecution and to suggest witnesses of their own.
The theory of individual liability adopted by the war crimes tribunal is crucial to the tribunal's deterrent effect. The Statute furnishes
the victims of rape with an arsenal adequate to bring charges against
individual offenders, the rapists' co-conspirators and superiors, and
through the chain of command to the person acting as head of state.
Because rape is illegal in the domestic laws of civilized nations, defendants cannot rely on any exception for those who could not have reasonably been expected to know that their act was unlawful. Holding
individuals criminally liable for their acts will help to deter potential
perpetrators at every level in the chain of command.
Finally, the victims of rape need special procedural
protections."8 ' The Statute requires that the tribunal provide for the
protection of victims and witnesses in its rules of procedure and evidence"82 and specifies that the protections should include in camera
proceedings and the protection of the victim's identity.' In addition,
the Trial Chamber must ensure that trial proceedings are conducted
with an eye toward protecting victims and witnesses.1 " The S.G.'s

179. For a discussion of the Iraqi claims mechanism, see infra note 359.
180. The Statute provides that the judges will adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials, and appeals.
See S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 15, at 42.
181. The Vancouver Session on Victims suggested the following- protecting the
identities of the victims in the press; the option of in camera testimony; anonymous
witness testimony; victim impact statements taking into account at sentencing; and
allowing the victims to have their own lawyers participate in the proceedings.
MacKinnon, supra note 174, at 2-3.
182. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. 15, at 42.
183. Id. Annex, art. 22, at 45.
184. Id. Annex, art. 20(1), at 44.
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Report emphasizes that "[gliven the nature of the crimes committed
and the sensitivities of the victims of rape and sexual assault, due
consideration should be given in the appointment of [prosecutorial]

staff to the employment of qualified women."' The statement of the
U.S. Representative regarding Resolution 827 goes even further, recommending that "women jurists sit on the Tribunal and that women

prosecutors bring war criminals to justice."'
E. Lessons from Nuremberg and Tokyo

As the only operational international war crimes tribunals in
history, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals provide valuable lessons
for the proposed war crimes tribunal. The Nuremberg Charter over-

came the disparities between the Continental and Anglo-American systems of criminal procedure, demonstrating that technical problems are
not insurmountable. m7 Although they are not without their critics,

the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals are generally regarded as a positive step forward in the enforcement of human rights.1 Nevertheless, the main criticisms of Nuremberg must be addressed.' Critics
of the Nuremberg trials label them as an egregious case of the victors
trying the vanquished in violation of the maxim nulla poena sine lege,
nullum crimen sine lege. 1" Critics also attack the Nuremberg trials

for holding individuals criminally liable and failing to adequately protect defendants' rights. The first criticism does not apply to the proposed war crimes tribunal in the former Yugoslavia, and, as proposed,

the war crimes tribunal would avoid the second and third criticisms.
The four "victorious powers" of World War II 5 established the
Nuremberg tribunal by a treaty with jurisdiction over individuals from

185. Id. at 22.
186. Meeting 3217, supra note 107, at 14. Two of the eleven judges, those representing Costa Rica and the United States, are women.
187. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 63-64 (1992) (outlining compromises reached in the Nuremberg Charter);
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 19-

20 (Summer 1992) [hereinafter AB.A Report].
188. In addition to granting the Nuremberg Tribunal jurisdiction over the human
rights violations embodied in "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity," the
Nuremberg Charter allowed the prosecutors to charge the defendants with "crimes
against the peace," which were defined as instigating a war of aggression.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 148, art. 6, at 288. Because this article is concerned
with protecting the human rights of Bosnian women and girls, the questions surrounding "crimes against the peace" are not analyzed here.
189. See generally WOErLEL, supra note 9, at 40-121; RICHARD H. MINEAR,
VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1971); THE NUREMBERG TRIAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990).
190. This Latin phrase stands for the principle that neither punishments nor laws
should be applied retroactively; individuals should not be penalized for actions not
criminal at the time they were committed.
191. The United States, The Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom.
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the European Axis countries. Critics contend that the tribunal erred by
imposing judgments on individuals whose state, Germany, was not a
party to the treaty. Even Justice Jackson, the Chief American Prosecutor, admitted in his opening statement before the Nuremberg tribunal
that "[ulnfortunately, the nature of the crimes is such that both prosecution and judgment must be by victor nations over vanquished
foes."' The process was particularly unfair because some Allied nationals, who were equally guilty of war crimes, were never prosecuted.

19

The proposed war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia can
be distinguished from the Nuremberg tribunal in two important ways.
First, it has the prior endorsement of the international community.'"
Second, the tribunal is an impartial body seeking to impose justice on
the victors as well as the vanquished. Serbian rapists of Muslim women and girls and Muslim rapists of Serbian women and girls would be
equally liable for their crimes, though it would be more difficult to
convict Muslim rapists of genocide than their Serbian counterparts.'
Selection of the defendents was one of the first tasks of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.'" An adamant critic of the Tokyo
trials argues that, for political reasons, the prosecutors conspicuously
omitted Emperor Hirohito, who was Japan's de jure sovereign and an
active decision-maker during the war.1' In addition, Telford Taylor
admits that the selection of defendants at Nuremberg was "hastily and
negligently discharged.""' Others claim that the procedural
protections outlined in the Nuremberg Charter were willfully violated
and that procedural irregularities were particularly egregious due to
the unavailability of appeal.1 "
Because choosing defendants will be a problem faced by the proposed war crimes tribunal, the Prosecutor should decide the criteria for

192. TAYLOR, supra note 187, at
193. See WOETZEL, supra note 9,
194. Although nineteen members
Charter, it was not until after the

168.
at 46.
of the United Nations adhered to the Nuremberg
judgments were handed down that the interna-

tional community affirmed the principles of international law contained in the Charter. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter
of the Nuremberg Tribunal, GA. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sees., at 188, U.N. Doc.
A/236 (1947) [hereinafter Affirmation of Nuremberg Principles]; TAYLOR, supra note
187, at 628.
195. See Section I,

supra.

196. For example, approximately 250 high Japanese officials were in custody before the Tokyo trial began, and the prosecution chose twenty-six. See MINEAR, supra
note 189, at 102.
197. Id. at 110-13.
198. TAYLOR, supra note 187, at 90.
199. See Michael P. Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on the Need for an International
Criminal Court, 135 DUKE J. INVL & CoMP. L. 136, 138 & n.22 (1991).
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their selection in advance. Allowing the Prosecutor to formulate guidelines regarding who will be prosecuted will guard against the risk that
potential defendants might be granted amnesty as part of a peace settlement. Political factors should not interfere with the impartial administration of justice. However, the war crimes tribunal faces an even
greater problem: unlike the scenario after World War II, none of the
potential defendants is in custody. The potential difficulties involved in
obtaining custody of defendants creates a serious risk of violating the
rights of the defendants - namely, by physical abduction. The infa*mous kidnappings of Adolf Eichmann and Humberto AlvarezMachain
by Israel and the United States, respectively, demonstrate the potential for abuse. To prevent such abductions, the rules of
procedure adopted by the judges of the war crimes tribunal should
specify that jurisdiction extends only to individuals voluntarily transferred to the tribunal by the state in which they were located.
Once defendants are brought before the tribunal, the Prosecutor
and judges must ensure adherence to the procedural guarantees specified in the Statute. The Statute diligently safeguards the procedural
rights of defendants, guaranteeing counsel, an interpreter, a speedy
trial, enough time to prepare a defense, protection against self-incrimination, and a presumption of innocence. According to the Statute,
an individual cannot be arrested unless there is a prima facie basis to
believe that he committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Thus, the Statute seeks to protect defendants against the
reputational effect of being tried erroneously. In addition, unlike the
Nuremberg Charter, the Statute of the tribunal provides an appeal
mechanism before judges uninvolved in the original trial.
One possible criticism of the Statute, however, is that it allows for
double jeopardy; the tribunal has jurisdiction over a defendant for
serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as war
crimes or genocide, even if he has already been tried by a national
court for an "ordinary" crime, such as rape, premised on the same
facts."1 Nevertheless, the tribunal can only try a defendant for the
same crime if the national trial was not diligently prosecuted before an
impartial tribunal. Moreover, even in the United States, where there is
a constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy,' a defendant
can be prosecuted by two different sovereigns if the laws of each sovereign allegedly have been broken.'
Systematic rape during armed
200. See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 251-52
and accompanying text.
201. S.G. Report, supra note 28, Annex, art. (1OX2Xa), at 40 (person tried by
national court for acts constituting serious violations of international humanitarian
law may be tried by international tribunal only if act for which he was tried was
characterized as an ordinary crime).
202. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.').
203. For example, the four Los Angeles police officers accused in the beating of
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conflict violates both national and international law.
Another criticism of the Nuremberg tribunal is that only states
bear responsibility under international law, and thus individual defendants should never have been tried.' However, as eloquently expressed by Justice Jackson, "[cirimes against international law are
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international
law be enforced.' 0 Furthermore, since the principle of individual liability is now well established in international law,' the proposed
war crimes tribunal is free to try individual perpetrators of rape.
The Nuremberg Charter has been appropriately criticized for
failing to exempt an individual from liability if he followed orders and
did not know and had no basis for knowing that the act ordered was
unlawful.' This problem will be avoided if the tribunal adheres to
the U.S. understanding of the Statute allowing the defense of ignorance of unlawfulness. In any event, it will be more difficult to establish a chain of command for the perpetrators of rape in Bosnia and
Herzegovina than it was for the Nazis."
Finally, critics of the Nuremberg tribunal charge that it violated
the principle of nulla poena sine lege, nullum crimen sine lege by
charging the defendants with crimes that were not clearly established
and therefore lacked precise definitions and penalties.' s In allowing

Rodney King, an African-American motorist, were brought to trial twice: once in Los
Angeles Superior Court on charges of assault, see Powell v. Superior Court of L.A.
County, 283 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (Cal. 1991), and once in federal district court on
charges of deprivation of rights on the basis of race under color of law. See United
States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
204. WOETZEL, supra note 9, at 100.
205. Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, quoted in D.H.N. Johnson, The Draft
Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 4 INTL & CoMr. L.Q.
445, 460-61 (1955).
206. See Elizabeth Zoller, Grounds for Responsibility in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 102, 106 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990)
("Whether as a customary rule or as a general principle of law, the norm on individual criminal responsibility for international crimes is now unquestionably part of
substantive international law.').
207. TAYLOR, supra note 187, at 630.
208. See Jeri Laber, Executive Director, Helsinki Watch, Address Before the New
York Bar Association (Apr. 7, 1993) (no hard evidence that order to rape comes from
above but clear that commanders do not discourage it); see also John F. Burns,
Balkan War Trial in Serious Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1993, at A9 (unlikely that
investigators will find paper trail linking leaders to actions taken by local commanders).
209. See M. CHERIF BASsIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND
DRAFt STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 3 (1987). But see
WOEVLEL, supra note 9, at 116 (nulla poena principle intended to protect against
abuse of justice through retroactive law but without injustice there is no violation of
the principle).
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the prosecution of crimes against humanity, which included Nazi offenses against German nationals, the Nuremberg trials "represented a
radical innovation in international law." 1 ° Previously, international
law had not imposed criminal penalties on a state's treatment of its
own citizens. " Nevertheless, the magnitude of the acts alleged put
the defendants on notice that they violated "principles common to the
major legal systems of the world.""' In any case, it is now indisputable that crimes against humanity violate international law.
The primary source for the definition of crimes against humanity
is the Nuremberg Charter.s" The expansive definition in Article 6(c)
includes
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated.2 .'
On December 11, 1946, the General Assembly fortified the definition
by unanimously approving Resolution 95(I), which affirmed "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal."15 Resolution 95(I) requested the International Law Commission to formulate these principles, and the resulting "Nuremberg Principles" declared that crimes
against humanity are punishable as crimes under international law,
regardless of whether committed "before or during the war.""" According to Telford Taylor, one of the United States prosecutors at the
Nuremberg war crimes trials, "as a moral and legal statement, clothed
with judicial precedent and United Nations recognition, the
Nuremberg principles are an international legal force to be reckoned
with." " Since crimes against humanity are now part of the general
principles of international law recognized by civilized nations," the

210. Orentlicher, supra note 82, at 2555.
211. Id.
212. Report to the President from Robert H. Jackson, Chief Counsel for the United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT% L.
178, 186 (Supp. 1945).

213. 82 U.N.T.S. 284.
214. Id. at 288.
215. Affirmation of Nuremberg Principles, aupra note 194.
216. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg

Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12), at 11,
U.N. Doc A/1316 (1950) [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles], reprinted in WOETZEL,
supra note 9, at 233-34.
217. TAYLoR, supra note 187, at 4; see also WOETZEL, supra note 9, at 54-55
(U.N. endorsement of Nuremberg Principles constitutes tangible evidence that majority of nations at that time regarded them as valid principles of international law).
218. BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 27; see also Quincy Wright, Proposal for an
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proposed war crimes tribunal does not run the risk of applying ex post
facto law.
F. The War Crimes Tribunal:A Step in the Right Direction
The proposed war crimes tribunal represents a positive step toward bringing the perpetrators of rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina to
justice, and it is not susceptible to the criticisms of Nuremberg and
Tokyo. Although skeptics focus on the difficulties in reaching a consensus on the mechanical details of the tribunal, the problems with obtaining custody of the defendants, the difficulties with establishing a
chain of command, and the tribunal's potential interference with the
peace process, they underestimate the genuine intellectual and political progress already made toward the tribunal. Moreover, because the
Statute requires states to arrest, detain, and transfer the accused to
the custody of the tribunal, those offenders who are indicted but not
transferred to the tribunal would be virtual prisoners within the few
states refusing to extradite them. Furthermore, the Security Council
may take enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
against those states refusing to relinquish custody over the accused.
Even in the worst-case scenario, assuming that the links in the chain
of command are too tenuous to support the prosecution of powerful
officials, the actual rapists would still be brought to justice.
With respect to the nine characteristics essential for an effective
forum,"'9 the war crimes tribunal represents a substantial improvement over domestic fora. The tribunal will not be open to charges of
nationalistic prejudice, and it will provide a sense of regularity that
will help with the enunciation of legal norms. Provided that the tribunal relies on its early judgments for precedential value, there is no
reason to assume it will suffer from the time delays associated with
the International Court of Justice. Because the tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction is clearly delineated, its determinations of guilt or
innocence will be guided by the existing international laws, such as the
Fourth Geneva Convention and the Genocide Convention.' Although
judicial opinions interpreting these laws are scarce at best, the
tribunal's opinions will develop such precedent. Once a defendant is in
custody, criminal judgments are more easily enforceable by any state
that has agreed to perform this task. Through the Security Council,

International Criminal Court, 46 AM. J. INL L 60, 71 (1952) (crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction); 1 BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRI4NAL COURT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 77 (1980) (subsequent war

crimes trials reconfirmed that massive abuse by a state of its own citizens is a
matter of legitimate legal concern to all mankind).
219. See supra note 101.
220. See S.G. Report, supra note 28, at 8 (The Security Council will not legislate
international humanitarian law; the tribunal will apply existing international humanitarian law).
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the international community could pressure states into assisting in the
collection of monetary judgments by seizing assets within a particular
state's jurisdiction. If properly amended, the Statute for the war crimes
tribunal would allow individual access to prosecution and would have
flexible procedures to allow victims of rape to testify or be deposed
anonymously in an intimate setting, rather than in public proceedings.
Nevertheless, the war crimes tribunal is susceptible to criticism
for being politicized and dominated by states whose nationals are not
subject to the tribunal's jurisdiction - none of the judges are from
either the Federal Republic or Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the.
tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed in the former
Yugoslavia since 1991."8 A truly impartial court requires permanence and prior establishment.' According to John Bridge,
[h]owever impartial and incorruptible members of an ad hoc tribunal might in fact be, the mere fact that the tribunal had been set
up expressly to try crimes arising out of particular circumstances

would suggest, however unjustly, that the tribunal is not impartial,
that the matters to be tried have been prejudged and that the tribunal has been set up to give a false impression that justice is
being done.'

As an ad hoc body, the war crimes tribunal could be accused of partiality because it would dispense case-specific justice - ad hoc tribunals
are always vulnerable to the question "why now?" It is estimated that
between two and four hundred thousand women were raped in Bangladesh in 1971,224 yet no tribunal was established to try the Pakistani
soldiers who committed the rapes. Recently, it has been reported that
Peruvian soldiers routinely rape women and girls in the course of their
struggle with the Shining Path guerrillas, yet the war crimes tribunal
would not hear the claims of these victims.z
Finally, due to the combination of the inherent difficulties in obtaining custody over the defendants and the Statute's prohibition of
trials in absentia, the war crimes tribunal will suffer from one of the
defects of U.S. courts - it will not be likely to resolve cases on the
merits.2 However, the war crimes tribunal is more likely to reach

221. Alfred P. Rubin, Nothing's Less Simple than a War Crimes Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1992, at A32.
222. See Vespasian V. Pella, Towards an International Criminal Court, 44 AM. J.
INT'L L. 37, 58 (1950).

223. John W. Bridge, The Case for an InternationalCourt of Criminal Justice and
the Formulation of International Criminal Law, 13 INVL & COMP. L.Q. 1255, 1271

(1964).
224. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 8, at 78; 2 BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CouRT: A STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 65-66 (1980).
226. James Brooke, Rapists in Uniform: Peru Looks the Other Way, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 1993, at A4.
226. Karadzic has already declared that the Bosnian Serbs will not cooperate with
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the merits of a case than a U.S. court for two reasons. First, prosecution before the tribunal would not face the procedural obstacles blocking the path of plaintiffs in the United States. Second, there is a higher chance that defendants will eventually surrender to the jurisdiction
of the war crimes tribunal because they would be imprisoned in those
few states refusing to extradite them.
In sum, as an ad hoc body, the war crimes tribunal meets six of
the nine criteria for an effective forum: (1) individual access to
prosecution; (2) decisions based on law; (3) norm enunciation; (4) enforcement; (5) timeliness; and (6) flexible procedures. Therefore, an ad
hoc war crimes tribunal is better than none at all. However, it is not
the optimum. A permanent international criminal court would possess
all of the positive features of a war crimes tribunal, and it would also
be free of partiality and politicization and would be more likely to
resolve cases on the merits.
IV. THE TIME HAS COME FOR A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

COURT
The international community should take advantage of the momentum generated by the proposed war crimes tribunal and seriously
consider creating a permanent international criminal court. The consensus on the need to prosecute those responsible for the atrocities in
the former Yugoslavia presents a unique opportunity for progress.
Although proposals for an international criminal court have languished
for years due to a lack of political will, support for the war crimes
tribunal in the former Yugoslavia should function as the catalyst for
an expanded mandate, and the tribunal should be structured in a way
that maximizes its translatable generic qualities so as to lay the foundation for a more permanent body.
As a permanent body, the international court would be truly impartial.' In addition, its establishment would relieve the world community of criticism for selective adjudication. Moreover, an international criminal court is less open to reproach for politicization because its
statute would only allow states that have submitted to its jurisdiction
to appoint judges and prosecutors. Finally, a permanent international
court would be more likely to reach the merits of a particular case
because states should be more willing to extradite individuals to an
impartial permanent body than to a politicized ad hoc tribunal.
Whereas the war crimes tribunal meets six of the criteria for an effective forum, an international criminal court would fulfill all nine.

the war crimes tribunal. See MacNeil/Lehrer Newahour (PBS television broadcast,
May 26, 1993).
227. See Quincy Wright, The Scope of an International Criminal Law: A Conceptual Framework, 15 VA. J. INTL L 561, 574 (1975).
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A. Evaluatingthe Merits of an InternationalCriminalCourt
Recent support for a war crimes tribunal with jurisdiction over
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia breathes new life into the
fifty year-old debate over the merits of an international criminal court.
Historically, the political climate was the most receptive to the idea of
an international criminal court in the first few years following the
Nuremberg trials, during which the international community affirmed
that an international tribunal could try individual state officials for
violations of the human rights of their own subjects." In the decades
since Nuremberg, however, states have generally refrained from pressing human rights concerns with other nations for fear of jeopardizing
international relations.' Nevertheless, even before the atrocities in
the former Yugoslavia, the problems of increasing worldwide terrorist
and drug-trafficking activity had rekindled interest in an international
criminal court."
1. Arguments in favor of an international criminal court
An international criminal court could consistently and uniformly
interpret and apply international criminal law," thus avoiding the
uncertainty of the present system. Currently, each state is obligated to
incorporate international criminal law norms into its domestic law.
The result has been "different normative proscriptions whose applications in the various legal systems are not always harmonious, let alone
identical."23 2 Furthermore, many state parties to international conventions have not yet incorporated their international obligations into
domestic law.' By providing a centralized forum, the international
court could develop a body of precedent in international criminal law.
Primarily, however, an international court will "assure the punishment
of individuals for acts which world opinion regard[s] as peculiarly
destructive of international peace and order, peculiarly shocking to the
conscience of mankind, and peculiarly likely to escape punishment by
national authority.'

228. See generally Nuremberg Principles, supra note 216.
229. See Orentlicher, supra note 82, at 2558-59.
230. See H. Con. Res. 66, 101st Cong., lot Sess. (1989) (calling for creation of an
international criminal court with jurisdiction over terrorism, illicit international nar-

cotics trafficking, genocide, and torture); American Bar Association Section of Interna.
tional Law and Practice Report to the House of Delegates, August 3, 1990, reprinted
in 6 INTL ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 284 (August 1990) (adopting resolution supporting
establishment of international criminal court with jurisdiction limited to violations of
U.N. Narcotics Convention); see also Scharf, supra note 199, at 140-44 (describing
events leading to growing sense of optimism about creation of international criminal

court).
231. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1264.
232. BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 70.
233. Id.

234. Wright, supra note 218, at 63; see also Pella, supra note 222, at 44 (Without
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An international criminal court is especially necessary when (1)
government officials allegedly violate the human rights of their own
subjects; (2) a state with custody of a suspect accused of an international crime is either unable or unwilling to prosecute the suspect
domestically or to extradite the individual to another state with jurisdiction; or (3) national courts cannot effectively deal with the international crime charged. The systematic rape of women and girls by
Bosnian Serbs falls into all three of these categories.
The need for an international court to prosecute international
crimes committed by members of the government of a state against its
own citizens is demonstrated by the fact that, despite notorious cases
of genocide in the past fifty years, none has ever been prosecuted under the Genocide Convention.' In effect, the Genocide Convention is
itself responsible for the dearth of adjudication because it leaves primary enforcement to municipal courts.' Such a solution is illusory;
states are either unwilling to indict their own leaders for carrying out
state policy"' or unable to prosecute them impartially.'
Even
when the government accused of the crimes is no longer in power, the
successor government may either be unwilling to try former officials or
may need the legitimacy of an international trial. 9 Since the current
system of combatting genocide fails to deter state officials from committing acts of genocide against their own citizens, the threat of prosecution by an international court is necessary.
There are many circumstances in which a state with custody of a
suspect is unable or unwilling to prosecute or extradite the individual
but might be willing to cede jurisdiction to an international criminal
court.8 0 For example, the criminal justice system of a small state
might be overwhelmed by the magnitude of a particular offense, in

an international criminal court, the Nuremberg Principles "would be perverted for
purposes of disguising the mien of vengeance as the mask of justice").
235. Report of the Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal
Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.471 at 11 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Working
Group Report]; see also Robert-Louis Perret, Doctrinal Basis for InternationalPenal
Jurisdiction, in TOWARDS A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL COURT 142, 143 (Julius Stone
& Robert K. Woetzel eds. 1970) [hereinafter TOWARDS A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL

COURT] (citing acts of genocide committed after adoption of Genocide Convention).
236. Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. VI, at 280-81.
237. See Julius Stone, Range of Crimes for a Feasible International Jurisdiction,
in TOWARDS A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 235, at 315, 335.
238. See ANTOINE SoTTILE, THE PROBLEM OF THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT

INTERNATIONAL COURT 60 (1951) (National courts cannot be independent and impartial when judging a head of state.).
239. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 11.
240. See State Department Programs and Policies: Hearings Before the Foreign
Operations Subcomm. of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (testimony of Secretary of State Warren Christopher) (international criminal
court attractive in situations where no country has authority or determination to go
ahead with prosecution).
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terms of the number of crimes committed." States with custody of a
national of another state are often reluctant to prosecute domestically
because of the potential diplomatic repercussions and the risk of allegations of an unfair trial. " The state with custody hampers prosecution when it does not have enough of an interest in the alleged
crime to try the offender and lacks an extradition treaty with a2 "state
that does have enough interest to pursue a vigorous prosecution.
Currently, if a state fails to prosecute an alleged international criminal
either who lives within its boundaries or who is one of its nationals,
another state with an interest in the case may resort to self-help to
obtain jurisdiction over the alleged offender. The classic case of selfhelp is Israel's 1960 abduction of Adolf Eichmann from Argentine territory for trial before the Israeli Supreme Court. The Security Council
condemned the abduction as potentially endangering international
peace and security," and critics have labelled the trial an act of vengeance.' Eichmann was tried by a court of a country that did not
even exist at the time the alleged acts were committed, outside the
territory where they took place, and was sentenced to death according
to the application of retroactive law.2' Even though the judges may
have performed their duties conscientiously, Eichmann's death may
have been a foregone conclusion without a fair trial. 7 An international criminal court as an alternative forum might have prevented the
abduction and would have "provided a setting free from taint and prejudice."2'
The international criminal court provides a more impartial alternative for those states hesitating to extradite a suspect because of a
judicial bias in the courts of the requesting state. 9 For instance, an
international criminal court is sorely needed for the trial of the two
Libyan intelligence agents accused of bombing Pan Am flight 103 and
a French airliner.' " Also, in light of the United States abductions of

241. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 11.
242. See John J. Parker, An International Criminal Court: the Case for its Adoption, 38 A.BA J. 642 (1952).

243. See A.B.A Report, supra note 187, at 8.
244. Resolution Adopted by the Security Council at its 868th Meeting on June 23,
1960, U.N. SCOR, 868 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4349.
245. See WOETZEL, supra note 9, at 256.

246. Id. at 258.
247. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1270.
248. WOETZEL, supra note 9, at 256.
249. Michael J. Glennon, Agora: International Kidnapping: State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L, 746, 755

(1992); see also A.B.
Report, supra note 187, at 6 (noting argument that an international criminal court would facilitate prosecution of criminals in accordance with
fundamental principles of human rights).

250. A U.S. grand jury has indicted the two suspects, but Libya refuses to extradite them to either the United States, Britain, or France. In April 1992, the In-

ternational Court of Justice refused Libya's request to enjoin the United States and
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General Manuel Noriega and Humberto Alvarez-Machain," 1 some
Caribbean and Latin American countries fear that if they refuse to extradite alleged drug traffickers, the United States will engage in military operations or abductions to obtain custody. 2 Surrendering the
alleged drug traffickers to an international criminal court would help
to dissuade the United States from future international kidnapping
activities.
In some cases, a fear of terrorist reprisals discourages a requesting state from extraditing fugitives.M Generally, the option of transferring the accused to an international criminal court would be more
palatable to the threatening state than subjecting their national to the
judicial system of an antagonistic state. Fortunately, this may make
terrorist retaliation less likely. Agreeing to transfer the suspect to an
international criminal court would mitigate the strain on the relations
between the state with custody, the suspect's home state, and the state
requesting extradition.' By providing an additional alternative forum, an international criminal court would show potential perpetrators
of international crimes that their actions will be punished.
For some crimes, like those charged at Nuremberg, an international criminal court is the only competent adjudicatory organ available. Although the Fourth Geneva Convention mandates prosecution or
extradition of those who have committed "grave breaches of international law,' the Convention suffers from "the fundamental defect of

Britain from taking action to compel it to surrender the accused. See Allan Gerson,
Compensate Libya's Victims, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at A23; Paul Lewis, Sanctions
on Libya Begin to Take Hold as Deadline Passes, N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 1992, at Al.
251. On December 20, 1989, the United States invaded Panama and captured
General Manuel Noriega, who was sentenced by a federal district court to a forty
year prison term for drug-trafficking charges. Larry Rohter, Noriega Sentenced to 40
Years in Jail on Drug Charges, N.Y. TIMEs, July 11, 1992, §1 at 1. On April 2,
1990, Drug Enforcement Agency officials kidnapped Humberto Alvarez-Machain from
Mexico so that he could stand trial in U.S. court. The Supreme Court ruled that although the abduction may have been contrary to international law, it did not divest
the district court of jurisdiction. United States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.
Ct. 2188 (1992).
252. AB.A. Report, supra note 187, at 7-8.
253. For example, in two recent cases, countries have bowed to pressure and
refused to extradite terrorists to the United States for prosecution. In the first case,
the former West Germany refused to extradite the Palestinian terrorists who allegedly hijacked Transworld Airlines Flight 847 in 1985 because members of a Palestinian
terrorist organization took two West German businessmen hostage in Beirut. The
second case involved a refusal by Greece to extradite a Palestinian terrorist accused
of planting a bomb on a Pan American airliner in 1982; the Palestine Liberation
Organization had warned the Greek government that extradition would harm their
relations. See generally Scharf, supra note 199, at 150-51.
254. See id. at 152-53 (noting that although support for extradition of Columbian
drug smuggling suspects is waning, Columbian President Trujillo has publicly endorsed the creation of an international court to fight narco-trafficking).
255. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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not being enforceable by an independent power superior to the states
which have adopted [it]."' Also, for crimes against humanity, an international court would serve the important function of forcing states
to publicly accept responsibility for their actions: "For adequate retribution and deterrence, the guilty should be prosecuted before all mankind."s 7 A state refusing to transfer its nationals to the international
court would have to assume moral and political responsibility for their
actions in front of the entire international community.' As a result,
the establishment of the court would help to deter war crimes and
crimes against humanity.
2. Arguments against an international criminal court
Concerns about sovereignty lie at the heart of most objections to
the establishment of an international criminal court. Skeptics of the
court argue that states will not be willing to extradite their nationals
to the international court for crimes committed within the state's own
territory,2 9 especially if the actions are not crimes under national
law.' The reluctance to surrender individuals for prosecution by an
international body derives from the Act of State Doctrine, which precludes one state from reviewing the acts of another state."' It is important to note, however, that the Act of State Doctrine has never been
a fully accepted rule of international law." Customary international
law does permit an intrusion on state sovereignty for the prosecution
of certain crimes under the principle of universal jurisdiction.'
Some proponents of an international criminal court argue that a state
best proves its sovereignty by voluntarily limiting it and accepting the
jurisdiction of an international criminal court.'
States are also concerned that both the court and its prosecutorial
arm could be politicized bodies exploited by hostile states.'
The
United States is concerned that the court will develop an unacceptable
interpretation of crimes and that risk of double jeopardy problems will
preclude national courts from prosecuting individuals acquitted by a

256. Perret, supra note 235, at 154.
257. Stone, supra note 237, at 335.

258. Id. at 336.
259. See Graefarth, supra note 78, at 75 (under present international conditions,
most states are neither ready to abandon criminal jurisdiction on important questions nor to take on general extradition obligations); Albert Gastmann, The Act of
State Doctrine in TOWARDS A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 235, at
242, 256.

260. George A. Finch, An International Court: the Case Against Its Adoption, 38
A.BA J. 644, 646 (1952).
261. Gastmann, supra note 259, at 242.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 249 (pirates can be tried by any nation holding them in custody).
See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
See SOrrILE, supra note 238, at 58; Bridge, supra note 223, at 1273.
Stone, supra note 237, at 325.
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politicized international court.'
Regardless of these uncertainties,
an international criminal court must be given a chance. There is no
reason to assume that the court will be susceptible to political influences if the judges and prosecutorial staff of the court are chosen carefully and the court's finances are drawn from a fixed fund. As for potential double jeopardy problems, very few of the individuals likely to
be tried by the international criminal court would have been prosecuted at all in its absence, due to the general reluctance of states to
prosecute or extradite certain nationals.
In some cases involving the prosecution of high level officials or
even heads of state, prosecution by an international court might exacerbate international tensions and interfere with diplomatic processes of
conciliation." 7 Nevertheless, if the court is a truly independent and
impartial body, its adjudication of codified crimes is less likely to be
portrayed as a political act. Furthermore, cooperation in diplomatic
negotiations should not be rewarded with amnesty from prosecution for
war crimes and crimes against humanity, lest the deterrent value of
international criminal law not be felt by those in powerful negotiating
positions.
Opponents of an international criminal court contend that its
creation is not feasible because of technical difficulties.'
States either will initially decline to become party to the court,20 or, having
consented to jurisdiction, will refuse to respond to specific requests for
extradition and assistance in the collection of evidence. However, the
difficulties in setting up an international court are no greater than
those attendant to the current attempt to implement a uniform international criminal law in more than 175 distinct states.' In addition,
the international community is not powerless to respond to a state's
noncompliance with the court's jurisdiction, as demonstrated by the
U.N. sanctions against Libya for its refusal to extradite alleged terrorists. Additionally, the U.N. can impose trade and economic sanctions,
limit the travel of the state's officials and citizens, and even go so far
as to deprive the state of its U.N. privileges."'
American critics of establishing an international criminal court

266. See Letter from Janet G. Mullins, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs,
Department of State, to The Honorable Dan Quayle, President of the Senate 1 (Oct.
2, 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Mullins Letter].
267. See Wright, supra note 218, at 64.
268. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 13.
269. See Scharf, supra note 199, at 138 (The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials were

unique because they were created by a small circle of nations able to exercise sovereignty in defeated countries.).
270. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-fourth
Session, 47 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 10,at 15, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 ILC Report].
271. See Lewis, supra note 250.
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argue that it would violate the U.S. Constitution because it would not
guarantee the "trial of all crimes... by jury.., in the state where the
said crimes shall have been committed.' 27 In a report to the Senate,
the Judicial Conference of the United States questioned whether Congress can constitutionally authorize U.S. participation in a non-Article
III court under its powers in Article I, section 8."' However, according to Louis Henkin, a noted international law expert, there is no constitutional bar to the establishment of a court:
If an international court sat outside the United States and imposed
punishment outside the United States, it would not be exercising
judicial power or other governmental authority of the United
States. The United States could adhere to such tribunals, agree
that American nationals might be tried by them, and even extradite
persons for such trials."'
The American Bar Association is concerned that if a request by the
United States for the extradition of an American national was met
with the suggestion of extradition to an international criminal court
instead, it might be unconstitutional for the United States to relinquish jurisdiction."' However, it might be within the president's foreign affairs power to choose prosecution by an international court
rather than no prosecution at all. 6 Nor would there be grounds for
constitutional objection if the United States agreed to prosecution
before an international criminal court of an American national who is
in another state's custody and accused of committing a crime
abroadY
On balance, the advantages of an international criminal court
significantly outweigh any negative consequences. Its existence would
facilitate the unbiased trial of individuals accused of violations of international criminal law who otherwise would not be brought to justice
or who would be adversely affected by national prejudices. The primary objection to the court is that states may not agree to its establishment or abide by its terms. A decision on the court's feasibility, however, cannot be reached without first evaluating the existing proposals
for an international criminal court.

272. U.S. CONST. art. IHI, § 6. See Finch, supra note 260, at 646-47.
273. Compare U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10 (stating that Congress shall have
power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations) with U.S. CONST.
art. M, § 2 (stating that judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under trea-

ties of the United States). See Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States
on the Feasibility of and the Relationship to the Federal Judiciary of an International Criminal Court 12 (1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Judicial Report].
274. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITTION 198-99 (1972).
275. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 187, at 13.
276. See id.
277. Id.
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B. History of Proposalsfor an InternationalCriminal Court
The United Nations first expressed its interest in the idea of an
international criminal court in 1948, when the General Assembly
asked the International Law Commission ("I.L.C.") "to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ
for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over
which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by international
conventions.' 78 In 1950, the I.L.C. responded that it thought the establishment of such an organ would be both possible and desirable, but
it would not recommend that the court be in the form of a criminal
chamber of the International Court of Justice."9 The General Assembly then established a committee composed of representatives from
seventeen states. This committee completed a draft statute for an
international criminal court ("Draft Statute") in August 1951.2w A
second committee was convened in 1952, and by August 1953 it had
prepared two alternative Draft Statutes, one for a court closely linked
to the U.N. and the other for a court operating independently."1
Meanwhile, the I.L.C. was hard at work drafting a Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind ("Draft Code") pursuant
to General Assembly Resolution 95(I).' s It prepared two drafts, one
in 1951 and one in 1954, both stumbling over the definition of aggression. Since the Draft Code and Draft Statute were closely linked, in
1954 and again in 1957, the General Assembly voted to postpone consideration of the Draft Statute until the parties agreed upon a definition of aggression. Such an agreement was not reached until 1974. In
1978, the General Assembly asked the I.L.C. to proceed with the formulation of the Draft Code, but no mention was made of the 1953
Draft Statute. It was not until 1988 that, when the I.L.C. envisioned
the use of the principle of universal jurisdiction to enforce the Draft
Code, the General Assembly encouraged the I.L.C. to explore all alternatives to that approach.'

278. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its forty-second Session, 45 U.N. GAOR, 45th Seas., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 at 40
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 ILC Report].
279. Id. at 40. In order to establish a criminal chamber of the I.C.J., its statute
would have to be amended because, according to Article 34, only states can be parties in cases before the court. To amend the I.C.J. Statute, the United Nations must
follow the same procedure as is necessary to amend the U.N. Charter. See infra
note 346. Therefore, the I.L.C. was concerned that one of the members of the Security Council would veto the amendment, and the international court would never be
established. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission Covering its Second Session,

5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in 2 FERENCZ, supra
note 224 at 267.
280. 2 FERENCZ, supra note 224, at 34-35.
281. 1990 ILC Report, supra note 278, at 41.
282. See Affirmation of Nuremberg Principles, supra note 194.
283. 1990 ILC Report, supra note 278, at 38 (the General Assembly repeated this
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On December 4, 1989, the General Assembly specifically asked the
I.L.C. to "address the question of establishing an international
criminal court... with jurisdiction over persons alleged to have committed crimes which may be covered under the [Draft Code].' In
1990, the I.L.C. responded with a report discussing the general issues
involved in establishing an international criminal court and examining
the alternatives. The 1990 report concluded that the principle of an
international criminal court was desirable.' For the next two years,
the General Assembly invited the I.L.C. to continue its work.' Finally, on November 25, 1992, in response to the I.L.C.'s 1992 detailed
report on the establishment of an international criminal court, the
General Assembly requested it to undertake a "project for the elaboration of a draft statute for an international criminal court as a matter
of priority ......

At its forty-fifth session in early summer 1993,

the I.L.C. working group on an international criminal court reported a
first draft statute to the General Assembly for comment.' It has
taken over four decades to come full circle.
C. Academic Proposalsfor an InternationalCriminal Court
In addition to the work of the I.L.C., several legal scholars have
devised their own proposals for an international criminal court. As
with the proposed war crimes tribunal, there is general agreement on
the basic structure and operation of the court. For example, state parties would nominate judges who represent the principal types of legal
systems in the world and are qualified in criminal law and international law.' An independent prosecutor's department would conduct
the tasks of investigation and prosecution after an initial screening
procedure had eliminated cases outside of the jurisdiction of the
court.2w The statute of the court would outline the procedural guar-

request in 1989); see also Graefarth, supra note 78, at 72.
284. Steven C. McCaffrey, Current Developments: The Forty-Second Session of the
International Law Commission, 84 AM. J. INTL L. 930 (1990).
285. 1990 ILC Report, supra note 278, at 52. The report has been criticized for
its minimal substantive discussion of any of the issues. See Scharf, supra note 199,
at 144-46.
286. See 1992 ILC Report, supra note 270, at 11.
287. GA Res. 47/33, 44th Sess., 73d mtg. (1992) (on file with author).
288. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fortyfifth session, U.N. GAOR, 48th Seas. Supp. No. 10, at 255, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993);
James Crawford, The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 88
AM. J. INL L. 140 (1994).
289. See French Proposal, supra note 38, at 43; SoTrILE, supra note 238, at 84.
290. Bridge suggests that the preliminary screening should be undertaken by
judges of the international criminal court chosen periodically for that purpose. For
prosecution to proceed, the allegations must be substantiated by a prima facie case.
Bridge, supra note 223, at 1275; see also Revised Draft Statute for an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess. Supp. No. 12, Annex, art. 33, U.N. Doc.
A/2645 (1954), reprinted in 2 FERENCZ, supra note 224, at 454-456 [hereinafter 1953
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antees necessary to protect the rights of the accused,"1 and there
would be provisions for appeals of convictions.' Penalties would be
prescribed in advance or in conjunction with national codes.' Finally, sentences would be executed under international supervision by
states willing to do so.2 '
As might be expected, however, agreement is limited. The central
dilemma in establishing an international criminal court is formulating
a court with meaningful powers and jurisdiction acceptable to states
jealous of their national sovereignty. This is a delicate balancing act.
The three areas causing the greatest divergence of ideas are the jurisdiction of the court, the initiation of suits, and the best method for
implementing the proposals for an international criminal court.
1. Jurisdiction
Various jurisdictional issues surround the creation of a permanent
international criminal court. Debate centers around the following questions: When could the court exercise jurisdiction? Which crimes would
fall within the court's competence? What should be the nature of the
court's jurisdiction?
a. Prerequisites to exercising jurisdiction
The first question is the scope of the personal jurisdiction of the
international criminal court. The most expansive view utilizes the
principle of universal jurisdiction, which would allow all states to exercise criminal jurisdiction over individuals within their custody who are
charged with offenses against the law of nations. This principle would
assure that an international criminal court would be able to assert jurisdiction over such individuals without obtaining consent from any
state. ' All states would be obligated to assist the court by extraditing persons indicted for offenses against the law of nations and by

Draft Statute] (provides for Committing Chamber composed of five judges appointed
annually to examine whether evidence is sufficient to support the complaint).
291. See Harlington Wood, InternationalCriminal Procedure in TOWARDS A F2ASIBLE INTERNATIONAL COURT, supra note 235, at 223, 269 (append document to draft
statute with basic principles of procedure and rules of evidence).
292. See 1992 ILC Report, supra note 270, at 30; BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at

234.
293. See Pella, supra note 222, at 49-50; BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 225.
294. See Bridge, supra note 223, at 1270 (But neither the state initiating prosecution nor the state of which the criminal is a national should execute the sentence.); see also So'rILE, supra note 238, at 89.
295. Wright, supra note 227, at 565; see also William B. Simons, The Jurisdictional Bases of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in THE NUREMBERG
TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 39, 45 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds.,
1990) (A group of states can exercise jurisdiction whenever the states could do so

individually.).
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assisting with the location of witnesses.' If a state refuses to extradite an individual, a trial in absentia might be required.'
Although the simplicity of this approach is attractive, few states
would endorse the establishment of an international court with such
expansive jurisdiction, and it is difficult to see how the system would
work in practice. Trials in absentia would be required every time a
state with custody of an alleged offender refused to transfer the accused to the jurisdiction of the court. States not party to the statute of
the court could not be forced against their will to transfer indicted
individuals to the court for prosecution.'
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the 1953 Draft Statute allows
the court to exercise its jurisdiction over an individual only when both
the state of which he is a national and the state where the crime was
allegedly committed have conferred jurisdiction on the court.' In addition, the state of which the alleged offender is a national must have
consented, in an agreement separate from that creating the court, to
grant the court jurisdiction over the specific offense charged.'s The
I.L.C.'s 1992 report discusses one danger of such an approach: requiring the consent of the state on whose territory the crimes were committed may allow the government to exempt from punishment officials
or other individuals who were responsible for atrocities in their own
country. 301 It also contravenes the Nuremberg principles by holding
national law above international criminal law.'
In addition, although pragmatists might argue that states would be unwilling to give
an international court jurisdiction to try their nationals without prior
consent,' demanding such consent as a prerequisite to the exercise
of jurisdiction conflicts with the principle of universal jurisdiction.
Others have offered various intermediate approaches. For example, the state with custody over the alleged offender could be given the
option of unilaterally conferring jurisdiction on the international criminal court. This process would be fair because all states would be able
to deliver one another's nationals to the court.' Or, there could be
296. Wright, supra note 227, at 567-568.
297. Id. at 575.
298. The Allies were able to establish the Nuremberg tribunal without Germany's
consent because as victors they had sovereignty over Germany. See Quincy Wright,
The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INfl L. 38, 50-51 (1947).
299. 1953 Draft Statute, supra note 290, art. 27, at 456; see also ABA. Report,

supra note 187, at 12 (Most states would still demand the consent of both the state
where the crime was committed and the state of nationality of accused.).
300. See Parker, supra note 242, at 641.
301. 1992 ILC Report, supra note 270, at 23.
302. See Affirmation of Nuremberg Principles, supra note 194, at 233 ("fact that
internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under

international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law").

303. ABA. Report, supra note 187, at 12.
304. Robert K. Woetzel, Correspondence: Professor John F Murphy's Letter on
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compulsory jurisdiction if the state on whose territory the crime was
allegedly committed had accepted the international court's jurisdiction.' A third alternative would have jurisdiction depend only on
whether the accused is a national of a state recognizing the competence of the international criminal court." A fourth proposal would
give the court jurisdiction over nationals of a state that had not conferred jurisdiction on the court as long as the state made no written
objection to the particular exercise of jurisdiction. 7 In practice, the
key player, for purposes of exercising jurisdiction, would be the state
with custody of the accused. Consequently, its consent to the international court's jurisdiction would be the most critical.
Most proponents of an international criminal court would initially
limit its jurisdiction to individuals, as opposed to states.m Some
would confine jurisdiction to individuals acting on behalf of states,
claiming it an irregular exercise of state sovereignty.' However, for
purposes of punishment, the distinction between state-sponsored and
non-state-sponsored international crimes is not relevant because, "ultimately, only individuals can be punished and thus deterred."" '
b. Crimes within the court's competence
The broadest definition of crimes against international law includes all acts that "violate a fundamental interest protected by international law committed with conscious or presumptive knowledge
Such a definition encomthat such act or omission is criminal."'
passes the three crimes within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg tribunal - crimes against the peace, crimes against the laws and customs
of war, and crimes against humanity - as well as any other crimes
subject to universal jurisdiction."' Some believe that for the international criminal court to operate effectively, these crimes must be codified in a single international convention.1 ' For an international crim-

Professor Gross's Comments on International Terrorism and International Criminal

Jurisdiction, 68 AM. J. IVL L. 717 (1974).
305. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 20.
306. Graefarth, supra note 78, at 84.
307. Stone, supra note 237, at 339.
308. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 2; see also 1953 Draft Statute, supra note 290, at 456; Wright, supra note 218, at 67. But see BASSIOUNI, supra

note 209, at 224 (international court should exercise jurisdiction over natural persons, organizations, and states).
309. Pella, supra note 222, at 55-56. An individual is a state actor when acting
with the "abetment" of a state. Id. at 56. A non-state actor, therefore, would be an
individual acting independently of state law or state support.
310. BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 52.
311. Wright, supra note 227, at 567.

312. Id. at 567-69.
313. Wright, supra note 218, at 71; cf BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 73, 92 (imperative to codify all international crimes into a single international criminal code,
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inal code to have any meaning, it must be universally accepted that
"[a] piecemeal acceptance of such a code subject to a variety of reservations would damn it before it became operative."' Nevertheless,
linking the establishment of an international criminal court to the
international acceptance of a convention, such as the Draft Code, risks
dooming the creation of the court.
A more narrow view of the crimes within the court's jurisdiction
would limit jurisdiction to those crimes that prejudice international
relations by disrupting peace or perpetuating a national policy repugnant to the international community."' 5 To avoid overburdening the
court, crimes of a generally international character that do not infringe
upon international relations should be prosecuted nationally under the
principle of universal jurisdiction."' 6 The main problem with this approach is determing which crimes encroach upon the peace and security of the world community and fall within the court's jurisdiction.
One way to delineate the international crimes punishable by the
international criminal court is to draw up international conventions on
particular crimes and require the signatories of the conventions to
submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the international criminal court
over these crimes."1 ' Eventually, the series of conventions could be
regarded as an international criminal code."1 8 Alternatively, the statute setting up the criminal court could limit its jurisdiction to specified
international conventions already in force that define crimes of an international character." 9 According to one of the strongest advocates
of an international criminal court,
[r]eliance on conventional international law as the primary source
of international criminal law is... justifiable for the following
reasons: (1) conventions are a source of binding legal obligations
qua with respect to their state-parties; (2) they frequently embody

but international crimes should also include all crimes outlawed by future multilateral conventions).

314. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1264.
315. Pella, supra note 222, at 54 (such crimes include crimes within jurisdiction
of Nuremberg tribunal); see also Stone, supra note 237, at 336 (choose offenses that
stir deep universal concern and condemnation but that do not usually involve states'
military, political, or economic self-preservation).

316. Pella, supra note 222, at 54.
317. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1265.
318. Id
319. See 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 2; Scharf, supra note
199, at 158 (rely on offenses already outlawed by international conventions and
extend court's jurisdiction to cover additional offenses in Draft Code if it is ever
completed); see also Roger S. Clark, Codification of the Principles of the Nuremberg
Trial and the Subsequent Development of International Law, in THE NUREMBERG
TRIAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 249, 253-54 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev

eds., 1990) (listing treaties generally agreed upon as examples of international criminal law).
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or reflect customary rules and general principles of international
law; (3) conventional obligations frequently ripen into customary
rules; (4) conventions frequently codifyjus cogens rules.'
A more restrictive approach would allow states to make declarations limiting the court's competence to particular conventions or to
specific offenses defined within a convention."l However, while such
an option would increase the number of states willing to set up an
international criminal court, "it would from the outset limit its central
function and effectiveness in such a way that would largely condemn it
to insignificance.'
Conferring jurisdiction on the international criminal court on a
treaty-by-treaty basis would generate the least resistance. By ratifying
the convention establishing the court, states would not be relinquishing any jurisdiction. Relying on conventions already in force to delineate the court's jurisdiction, however, might be quicker because the
only hurdle would be setting up the court. The most efficient approach
would be to create an international court that would obtain jurisdiction
on a treaty-by-treaty basis and then to amend existing conventions defining international crimes to confer concurrent jurisdiction on the
court. The signatories to such conventions have already completed the
time-consuming process of reaching an agreement on the substantive
provisions. Regardless of which crimes were determined to be within
the court's jurisdiction, statute of limitations questions and retroactivity issues would have to be addressed up front.
c. Nature of the court's jurisdiction
The 1990 I.L.C. Report outlines the three options regarding the
nature of the court's jurisdiction: exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
falling within the court's competence; concurrent jurisdiction between
the court and national courts; and restricting the court to only reviewing competence.'
Those who argue in favor of exclusive jurisdiction for the international criminal court state that it should have sole jurisdiction over
certain international crimes."2 Exclusive jurisdiction would lead to
the development of a coherent and consistent body of law with regard
to the crimes within the court's jurisdiction. It would also circumvent
conflicts of jurisdiction between different states with an interest in the
case.'
However, completely relinquishing jurisdiction over certain

320. BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 24.

321.
ciation
322.
323.
324.
325.

See Graefarth, supra note 78, at 84 (discussing 1984 International Law Assoproposal).
Id.
1990 ILC Report, supra note 278, at 48.
Bridge, supra note 223, at 1265.
Scharf, supra note 199, at 160.
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crimes would constitute a significant infringement on state sovereignty.' According to Bernhard Graefarth, uthe notion that states would
be prepared to delegate their sovereignty over crimes committed on
their territory, against them, or by their citizens to an international
criminal court is so far from reality that it has hardly been seriously
defended."'
Most advocates of an international criminal court agree that it
should have concurrent jurisdiction with national courts. However,
while no national court could try an individual for an offense already
adjudicated by the international criminal court," adjudication by a
national court would not preclude the international criminal court
from exercising jurisdiction.' Some scholars suggest that an indictment by the international criminal court would terminate any local
proceeding,'m but others recommend that a request for extradition to
the international court be refused if a national court had initiated
prosecution."
Some support exists for the use of the international criminal court
as a supplemental review body. According to this proposal, at the request of a state involved in a case, the court would review a national
court's decision of an offense contained in the Draft Code. 2 To capitalize on the work already completed by the national court, the international court would adopt a "clearly erroneous" standard with respect
to the review of facts, an "abuse of discretion" standard for issues involving discretionary balancing, and a de novo standard for questions
of international criminal law. The court would also be able to issue
advisory opinions in cases involving the application of the Draft
Code.' - This system is attractive because it could encourage national
courts to adjudicate more conscientiously.'m
Establishing a court with only review competence, however, fails
to solve many of the problems that call for the creation of an international court. For example, a state would not have the option of an

326. Id.
327. Graefarth, supra note 78, at 81. When granting its advice and consent to tlie
Genocide Convention, the U.S. attached an understanding construing Article VI,
which allows for trial before an international penal tribunal if one is established, to
mean that "nothing ... shall affect the right of any state to bring to trial before its
own tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside the state.' International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, S. Rep.
No. 94-23, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 10 (1976).
328. 1953 Draft Statute, supra note 290, art. 50, at 457.
329. Wright, supra note 218, at 69. But see BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 193-95
(prosecution by an international court can be barred by double jeopardy).
330. Wright, supra note 218, at 70.
331. BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 193-95.
332. Graefarth, supra note 78, at 86.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 87.
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international prosecution in a case where domestic prosecution is not
politically viable. It might also be difficult for an "involved state" to
contest a national judgment because of the potential political repercussions. Furthermore, granting an international court final review competence over national courts' decisions represents a greater relinquishment of sovereignty than agreeing to concurrent jurisdiction.'
2. Initiation of suits
In its 1990 report, the I.L.C. considered six possible initiators of
suits: (1) all states; (2) states party to the court's statute; (3) any state
with an interest in the case; (4) intergovernmental organizations of
universal or regional character; (5) nongovernmental organizations;
and (6) individuals.' Although most proponents of an international
criminal court would allow only states or organs of the United Nations
to initiate suits,"7 it is crucial that individuals and nongovernmental
organizations be allowed to bring claims to the attention of the prosecuting body.' One of the most important purposes of an international criminal court is to provide a forum for adjudicating crimes that
disrupt international peace and security when no state possesses the
political will to bring the perpetrators of such offenses to justice. However, to limit frivolous claims, "adequate and available" domestic remedies should be exhausted before an individual can bring a claim before the court.
3. Method of implementation
There are four possible ways to establish an international criminal court: (1) create the court as an additional organ of the United
Nations; (2) set it up by General Assembly resolution; (3) encourage
states to sign an international convention establishing the court; or (4)
focus on the creation of a committing chamber that would issue public
indictments after formal proceedings. Interestingly, there is almost
universal agreement that the best course of action is to initially take a
minimalist approach, so as to reduce resistance, and then to later

335. See 1992 ILC Report, aupra note 270, at 18.
336. 1990 ILC Report, supra note 273, at 49.

337. See Pella, supra note 222, at 62-63 (suits could be brought by states or an
organ of the U.N. upon referral by states); Graefarth, supra note 78, at 88 (states
would bring suits before court sitting as reviewing body); ABA. Report, supra note
187, at 18 (only states should have the right to institute proceedings); 1990 ILC
Report, supra note 278, at 49 (considering option of requiring authorization by either
General Assembly or Security Council before case could be submitted); 1953 Draft
Statute, supra note 290, art. 29, at 456 (only state parties can initiate prosecutions);
Wright, supra note 218, at 68 (only allow General Assembly to bring claims).
338. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 209, at 226-27 (allowing state-parties, organs of

the U.N., intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and individuals to
file complaints with Procuracy).
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expand the court's jurisdiction and membership. " Extensive proposals should wait until a flexible body has been set up and engendered
confidence.' " Some argue that the court should be an available judicial forum that only meets when needed."'
An international criminal court could be established by amending
Article 7 of the United Nations Charter.' Although some argue that
amendment of the Charter is unnecessary because Article 7(2) already
allows for the establishment of subsidiary organs,' others contend
that there is no support in the present United Nations Charter for the
establishment of an international criminal court.'" One advantage of
establishing the court as an organ of the United Nations would be the
Security Council's ability to take necessary measures to ensure the
assistance of states and to effectuate the court's judgments.' " However, given the difficulty of amending the Charter, this option may not
be practical.' Also, involvement with the U.N. may increase allegations of politicization.
It has been argued that the international criminal court could be
set up pursuant to a General Assembly resolution under Article 22 of
the U.N. Charter." Article 22 allows the General Assembly to establish subsidiary organs necessary for the performance of its functions.' Since the functions of the General Assembly include maintaining international peace and security and developing international
law, the court would qualify as a necessary subsidiary organ."' The
problem with this approach would be that the court might lose its
independence if its finances are debated annually in the General As-

339. See Julius Stone, Introduction, in TOWARDS A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT xii; Parker, supra note 242, at 642.
340. 1992 Working Group Report, supra note 235, at 15.
341. See 1953 Draft Statute, supra note 290, at 43; 1992 Working Group Report,
supra note 235, at 2; A.BA Report, supra note 187, at 17.
342. U.N. Charter,supra note 99, at 192 (Article 7 names the six principle organs
of the U.N.).

343. SorrILE, supra note 238, at 83.
344. French Proposal, supra note 38, at 11; see also WOETLRL, supra note 9, at
51-52 (Specific consent of states would be required before the U.N. could establish
an international court and would probably require an amendment of the U.N. Charter.).
345. Provided that one purpose of the court is the maintenance of international
peace and security, the Security Council may use any means necessary to facilitate
its effective operation. See U.N Charter, supra note 99, arts. 3942, at 199-200.
346. See Bridge, supra note 223, at 1277-78. Amendments to the U.N. Charter
come into force when adopted by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly
and ratified by two-thirds of the members of the U.N., including all the permanent
members of the Security Council. U.N. Charter, supra note 99, art. 108, at 214.
347. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1278.
348. U.N. Charter, supra note 99, art. 22, at 195.
349. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1278.
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sembly. ° This need not happen, however, since precedent exists for
legislative bodies to establish judicial organs and later refrain from
interfering in their activities.M To avoid influence by the General
Assembly, a fixed fund for the court could be established.
The third alternative - creating a permanent international court
by means of an international convention - would be advantageous
because it would only include states that favor the creation of an international criminal court.S Genuine progress at the negotiating table
might outweigh the time delay caused by the domestic ratification
procedures of the state parties. The main problem with this approach
would be a lack of the prestige typically associated with a United Nations organ.m
Gerhard Mueller proposes a fourth alternative: establishing a
committing chamber as an independent institution apart from the
international criminal court.' The committing chamber would have
ex parte jurisdiction and would receive facts regarding international
crimes. It would hold an inquiry and make a public accusation if necessary after formal proceedings. Although the committing chamber could
not compel the presence of an individual if the state with custody refused to surrender him, it could thrust the uncooperative state into the
spotlight of world opinion.'
Moreover, the committing chamber
could indict the head of the uncooperative state and issue an arrest
warrant to be executed by any signatory nation.sw
The idea of using world public opinion to shame a state into accepting jurisdiction of the international court is appealing and has few
legal disadvantages. However, unless the head of a recalcitrant state
himself is accused of a crime falling under universal jurisdiction, it
would be contrary to international law for another state to arrest and
transfer him to the international court.
D. The Time is Ripe: Using the Prosecution of Rape in the Balkans as
a Test Case for the InternationalCriminal Court
The international community must pursue two goals in tandem:
the establishment of a war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
and the creation of a permanent international criminal court. Lack of

350. See id. at 1279.
351. Wright, supra note 218, at 66 (citing example of United States Congress,
which established and maintains federal judicial system, with exception of Supreme
Court, but is constitutionally prohibited from exercising judicial power).

352. See Perret, supra note 235, at 155.
353. Bridge, supra note 223, at 1279; Wright, supra note 218, at 67.
354. Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Two Enforcement Models for International Criminal

Justice in ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE JEAN GRAVEN 107 (1969).
355. Id. at 113-14.

356. Id. at 115.
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progress in one area should not be allowed to stymie the other. If a
war crimes tribunal becomes operational, the world community should
build upon its success and establish a permanent international court
ready to cope with future instances of crimes against international
law. On the other hand, if progress on the war crimes tribunal stagnates, the prosecution of the perpetrators of rape in the Balkans would
be a good test case for an international criminal court. Few states
would disfavor prosecution of the atrocities committed in the former
Yugoslavia in front of an international criminal court.
To capitalize on current United Nations support for bringing war
criminals to justice, 7 the United States should initiate efforts to
amend Article 7 to include an international criminal court as an organ
of the United Nations. To improve chances for U.N. ratification of the
amendment, states should confer jurisdiction on the court on a treatyby-treaty basis. Even if setting up the international criminal court as
an organ of the United Nations is not viable, the court could be established by means of an international treaty. Although several powerful
states might resist, the court must start somewhere to demonstrate
credibility.' The statute of the international court could draw on the
Statute for the war crimes tribunal and provide for a Mueller-style
committing chamber. Other than a domestic exhaustion requirement,
no limits should be placed on the initiation of proceedings; any risk of
frivolous claims would be circumvented by the screening procedure of
the prosecuting body. It would also be important to create a mechanism for compensating the victims of international crimes.'
357. Support is not confined to the Security Council. See Madeleine K Albright,
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement to the
Security Council 1 (Feb. 22, 1993) (on file with author) (noting that General Assembly has urged creation of war crimes tribunal).

358. The United States would face domestic pressure to be party to a convention
establishing a permanent international criminal court. A joint resolution introduced
on January 28, 1993 expresses the intent of Congress that the U.S. should make
every effort to advance proposals for the establishment of an international criminal
court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international character. S.J. Res. 32, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (resolution favorably reported by Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on May 20, 1993); see also Foreign Operations Appropriation Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 2066-67, §599E (1990) (U.S. should explore need for

establishment of an International Criminal Court to assist international community
in dealing more effectively with criminal acts defined in international conventions);

ABA. Report, supra note 187, at 1 (resolved that U.S. Government should have
view toward establishment of an international criminal court). Although the executive branch is skeptical about the possibility of reaching a consensus on the issues

surrounding the establishment of an international court, it has also stated that it
would be "willing to consider the establishment of an international tribunal in the

event that high ranking Iraqi officials fall into the custody of the United States."
Mullins Letter, supra note 266, at 5. In 1991, the judicial branch concluded that
more work needs to be done before it can be said whether an international criminal
court would be feasible and whether United States participation would be desirable.

Judicial Report, supra note 273, at 16.
359. Such a mechanism could follow the model of the United Nations Compensa-
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The next step in the establishment of a permanent court would be
to amend the Genocide and the Fourth Geneva Conventions to explicitly confer concurrent jurisdiction on the international criminal
court.' Since these two conventions outlaw particularly heinous
crimes, opposition to the amendment process is likely to be limited.
Any state party to the amended conventions and the statute of the
international court would be obligated to transfer alleged offenders
within their custody to the international criminal court. No additional
consent would be required. Once the Mueller-style committing chamber
indicted an individual, the spotlight of world opinion would focus on
those states refusing to transfer him to the international court. Although there are no guarantees, there is reason to hope that the pressure of world opinion would result in alleged offenders being surrendered for trial.
To gain legitimacy, the international criminal court might begin
its life by considering the following four cases. The prosecutor's department could first investigate allegations against Indonesian authorities
for the treatment of Roman Catholic Timorese in East Timor. Human
rights groups charge that between one and two hundred thousand
Roman Catholic Timorese have died of starvation, disease, or execution
since Indonesia annexed the area.'Z Second, the prosecutor might
respond to the right-wing and neo-Nazi attacks on asylum-seekers in
Germany. According to German authorities, more than two thousand
attacks were carried out last year, resulting in seventeen deaths and
almost six hundred injuries.' Third, recent claims that Peruvian
soldiers routinely rape women and girls in the course of their struggle
against the Shining Path guerrillas could.be investigated and soldiers

tion Commission, which was established by Security Council Resolution 687. The
U.N. Compensation Commission was set up to provide compensation for claims
against Iraq stemming from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Funding for the
claims is to be gleaned from Iraq's next oil sale. The Security Council has allowed
Iraq to sell $1.6 billion worth of oil, with thirty percent of the proceeds to go to the
compensation fund. John R. Crook, Current Development: the United Nations Compensation Commission - A New Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 Am. J.
INTL L. 144 (1993). Individuals submit claims that require minimal documentation
to the state in which they reside, and the state then files consolidated claims. Id. at
149, 152. If an individual is stateless, the Commission can empower "an appropriate
person, authority or body" to submit claims on their behalf. Id. at 150 (quoting United Compensation Commission, Guidelines Relating to Paragraph 19 of the Criteria
for Expedited Processing of Urgent Claims, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/5, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 1031).
360. Although Article VI of the Genocide Convention already provides for trial by
an international penal tribunal, it specifies that the Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention must also have accepted the jurisdiction of the international tribunal. Genocide Convention, supra note 17, art. VI, at 280-82.
361. David Binder & Barbara Crossette, As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for
a Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1993, § 1, at 1.
362. Id.
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could be tried.' Fourth, the international criminal court could examine the "campaign of terror" which has been waged against the Kurds
in Northern Iraq, capitalizing on the hundreds of Iraqi files, captured
by Kurdish rebels immediately following the Persian Gulf war, which
document many officially-sponsored atrocities.' Finally, an investigation into the current slaughter taking place in Rwanda may be warranted.
This short list of cases represents international crimes committed
in both the industrialized and developing world and includes crimes
committed with and without government approval. Even if the permanent international criminal court decided that it did not have jurisdiction over some of these crimes, such a determination would serve the
purpose of demonstrating its ability to make reasoned judgments.
V. CONCLUSION

The defects of the fora currently available to the victims of rape in
Bosnia and Herzegovina signal the pressing need for an international
criminal adjudicatory body. At the moment, victims have little hope of
actually recovering monetary relief. In addition, perpetrators of rape
will not be deterred by the remote possibility of either an adverse judgment for civil damages or criminal prosecution.
The proposed war crimes tribunal is a step in the right direction.
It will have jurisdiction over the systematic rapes committed in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and its theory of individual liability will allow all
levels in the chain of command to be prosecuted if evidentiary barriers
can be overcome. Although it may be difficult to bring the accused
before the tribunal, their freedom of movement will be severely constricted. The Security Council will be able to sanction any states harboring the alleged perpetrators of rape. However, the Statute of the
war crimes tribunal and the tribunal's rules of procedure need to be
fine-tuned to provide clear access to individual claimants and mechanisms for victim compensation.
The time has come, however, for the international community to
go one step further. The uncertainty surrounding the establishment of
the war crimes tribunal diminishes its deterrent effect. A permanent
international criminal court would provide an impartial forum less
likely to be influenced by political considerations. The rules of procedure could be designed to allow for individual access to the prosecution
and victim protection. The court could prosecute international crimes
committed within national boundaries, and its decisions would have
precedential value for purposes of norm enunciation. The use of prece-

363. See Brooke, supra note 225.
364. Judith Miller, Iraq Accused: A Case of Genocide, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1993, §

6 at 12.
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dent would also facilitate the rendering of judgments without undue
delay. Because both the assets and the persons of international offenders would be subject to seizure in all states adhering to the court's
jurisdiction, offenders would be more likely to appear before the court,
thus increasing the number of cases heard on the merits. The court's
judgments would also become easier to enforce as more states join the
international court.
An international criminal court is especially important now due to
the increased likelihood of ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War era.
For deterrence purposes, perpetrators of international crimes must
understand that they will be held personally liable. Although the path
to the creation of a permanent international court will be arduous,
"has not experience taught us that the utopias of today are the realities of tomorrow?"

365. SOrTILE, supra note 238, at 93.

